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Chapter 1 - Introduction
Arab national identity has consistently been transformed by what it opposes. Initially conceived
as the negation to the Ottoman imperial project before being endowed with new life during the
struggles of liberation against the European states during the first half of the twentieth century,
Arab nationalism has both been created by and fueled conflict within the Middle East. One such
antagonism that has played a formative role in the modern conception of a collective Arab
identity is the oppositional stance towards Israel.1 Confronting Zionism, since the
commencement of the mass migrations and the appropriation of land in historical Palestine, has
been an essential ideational component in the national psyche within the states that found
independence during the wave of de-colonization that took form in the middle of the twentieth
century, as well as in the supranational conception of the ‘Arab world’.2 Though there has been
some dampening of the commitment to opposing Israel, there is still maintenance of some level
of Palestinian support evidenced by the persistent lack of formal peace and recognition by the
majority of the states within the Arab League, as well as the League’s continued public stances.3
In this sense, Arab national identity possesses a distinctive character. It is quite rare to find

1

This opposition has historically been propelled individually by a number of Arab statesmen and has
been reified in the Arab League Boycott of Israel in 1945, the United Arab Republic Charter of 1962, the
Khartoum Resolution of 1967 and the OAPEC oil embargo as part of the 1973 war. For more on the ways
in which continued opposition to Israel was formative in the political mobilization of a collective Arab
identity, see: Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2003).
2
The term Zionist for the purpose of this analysis is used in reference to the movement for the
establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This movement began prior to the official establishment
of the Israeli state in 1948 and hence, since this analysis will interact with these territories prior to that
establishment of statehood, the term “Zionist occupation” will be employed. For the evolution of Arab
nationalism in opposition to the Zionist movement, see: Rashid Khalidi, ed., The Origins of Arab
Nationalism (New York : Columbia University Press, 1991), 17.
3
“Arab League head warns no Mideast peace deal without Palestinian state” Reuters, June 17, 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-arabs/arab-league-head-warns-no-mideast-peacedeal-without-palestinian-state-idUSKCN1TI1QP ; “Arab League formally rejects U.S. policy shift on Israeli
settlements” Reuters, November 25, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians-arableague/arab-league-formally-rejects-u-s-policy-shift-on-israeli-settlements-idUSKBN1XZ29E
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elsewhere in the world a feeling of obligation that is embedded in multiple political territorial
entities to oppose a specific state.4 To be Arab is to oppose Israel or, as was declared in the
Charter for National Action of the United Arab Republic in 1962: “The determination to end the
Israeli aggression on the land of Palestine is a determination to eliminate a dangerous pocket of
imperialist resistance to the Arab struggle.”5 Hence the conflict that has been so central to the
region has rarely been analytically divided into individual wars between single states but rather
as an encompassing totality defined as the Arab-Israeli conflict. That allotted title is once again
indicative of the exceptionalism that is created discursively when conceptualising the relation
between the ‘Arab world’ and Israel. A point is being reached where it is arguable that two
events within the same supposedly extended conflict are temporally separated by almost an
entire century. Thus large conceptual homogeneous units become central to understandings of
the conflict: a temporal moment comprised of numerous decades and a nebulous bloc of Arab
states pushing against a monolithic Zionist force that perpetually repels this joint onslaught.
But a thorough historicization of these relations allows for the identification of changes
within the landscape and distinctive moments. Two different Arab states (Egypt and Jordan, as
well as the Palestinian Authority) have officially altered their public opposition to Israel through
recognitional agreements. The formal Arab League boycott of relations with Israel has
informally ceased to exist. A peace process is said to have been birthed, killed, resurrected and
then killed again. Clearly there are dynamics that exist beyond the mere antipathy between these

4

In the majority of situations in which this exists, it is in response to a hegemonic imperial power, such as
collective opposition to the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia or the aforementioned Ottoman Turks. The
distinction in this scenario is the collective Arab belief that Israeli violation of Palestinian land is an affront
to all Arabs. Opposition to Israel extends spatially into areas such as Western North Africa that have been
untouched by Israeli military occupation. For more on such opposition, see: Michael Laskier, “Israel and
Algeria amid French Colonialism and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954-1978”, Israel Studies, 6, No. 2
(2001), 1-32.
5
Alan Horton, The Charter For National Action of the UAR (Cairo: 1962), 19. http://www.icwa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/AWH-5.pdf
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two actors. Too often analyses of the issue revolve around the Israeli state and the Palestinian
people as the two primary architects with the different Arab political actors being identified as
secondary or tertiary contributors to the collage. But such a framework is entirely disorientated
and thus any conclusions emanating from it will either be insufficient or obstructive. The
primary purpose of political analysis should be to uncover the loci of power and provide clarity
to their inner mechanisms. Arguments that place the Palestinian people at the centre of the
analysis do so in bad faith, not as a method of emphasising their struggle but as a tool to
appropriate blame for their continued subjugation. The regional centers of power cannot be
found in Gaza and the West Bank in which even the primary requirements to any form of
internationally recognised sovereignty are absent. Thus a new conceptualization is needed, one in
which the dominant players are those who at the very least can make a claim to the backing of a
state. This starting point acknowledges the centrality of the Arab actors to this conflict.
Once that centrality is established, a new question arises: what is the role of the Arab
actors in the conflict? Most analyses take Arab opposition to Israel as a given. There can be no
doubt that these states have been quite meticulous in cultivating this image of opposition as well
as solidarity with the Palestinian cause.6 The majority of the scholarship thus takes this stance at
face value and continues from this point of departure. But again, through a simple inspection of
where power (political and economic) lies in the Middle East, an intuitive level of skepticism
emerges. It is quite notable that the abundance of certain resources in the Middle East has

“Sisi says Egypt will not accept anything against Palestinian wishes” Reuters, June 2, 2019.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mideast-egypt/sisi-says-egypt-will-not-accept-anything-againstpalestinian-wishes-idUSKCN1T30SP ; “Palestine ‘dear to the hearts of Arabs’, Saudi envoy tells UN” Arab
News, October 24, 2019. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1573481/saudi-arabia ; “Qatar FM: Palestine
is the core of all Arab issues” Middle East Monitor, September 12, 2019.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190912-qatar-fm-palestine-is-the-core-of-all-arab-issues/ ;
“Jordan’s Abdullah: Israel imposing an ‘unthinkable situation’ on Palestinians” The Times of Israel, 15
January, 2020. https://www.timesofisrael.com/jordans-abdullah-israel-imposing-an-unthinkable-situationon-palestinians/
6
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provided several states considerable relevance in the global political economy. The Gulf
Cooperation Council plays a fundamental role in the circulation of capital globally and the
beneficiaries of the GCC’s positioning have accrued enormous wealth as a result. Moreover, that
wealth has frequently been transformed into “hard power” through defence spending more
aggressively than in any other area of the world with military expenditure as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product of the “Arab World” equalling 6.2% as of 2016 in comparison to the
global average of 2.2%.7 Additionally, relations between the wealthiest and the most heavily
militarised Arab states are almost unanimously publicly acknowledged by the United States as
strategic allies and essential regional partners.8
When all that is considered, one might become inclined to posit why, despite the
supposed backing of these states, a resolution of the conflict has not been reached. That is not to
say that there is consensus among Palestinian demands, there are various facets to Palestinian
resistance. Statehood and self-determination are the most prominent of these aspirations, in the
sense that they are discussed and even occasionally endorsed on the international stage.
However, statehood is not a monochromatic issue and even the mild implementations of a
supposed path to statehood that are being applied are highly criticised.9 The larger point is that
the realisation of this abstract demand for statehood has not taken place. Rashid Khalidi
predicted that “(C)ertainly the aspirations of the Palestinians to live as a sovereign people in their
own land are likely to be further denied, for a time at least and perhaps lastingly. Their ability to

7

"Military expenditure (% of GDP)," The World Bank, last modified March 29, 2018,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
8
The emphasis on the relationship with the United States is due to their presence on the UN Security
Council, particularly when considering the history of American vetoing of resolutions pertaining to the
conflict. See: Saliba Sarsar, “The Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United
Nations”, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 17, no. 3 (2004), 457-470.
9
Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour, “Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the
Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 40, no. 2, (2011), 6-25.
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exercise sovereignty in the context of a viable independent Palestinian state may well have been
closed off permanently by the success of Sharon’s program, materially abetted by the collusion
of the Bush administration over six crucial years.”10 The prediction has largely been proven to be
true and that is without taking into account the other aspects of Palestinian resistance that have
not materialised.11 This leads me to the primary hypothesis of this research, and this will be
elaborated on extensively in upcoming chapters, is that the Arab states’ desire to support the
Palestinians is largely opposing their direct interests due to the numerous profit-creating
opportunities that the conflict provides. The Arab states have, either by entrenchment of Israeli
state power or disenfranchisement of the Palestinian political movement, played an active role in
the perpetuation of the Zionist occupation.
Prior to extrapolating on the central questions of this analysis, however, it is crucial to
identify the cases on which this analysis will focus. This analysis will not operate on bilateral
lines or solely focus on the relationship between two or more states along an extended
chronology. Instead it will be conducted in different moments and it will interrogate the essential
elements that defined regional exploitation and perpetuation of the conflict within these
moments. Additionally different states will be emphasised in these different moments in order to
address the shifting regional dynamics of power. Adequately identifying the loci of power in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is among the objectives of this analysis and placing hegemonic

10

Rashid Khalidi, The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood, (Boston, Beacon
Press: 2006), 260.
11
These include the right of return, the cessation of settlements, the dismantling of apartheid laws
pertaining to taxation and land ownership, the obstacles to the entry and exit of commodities in and out of
Palestine, the exploitation of Palestinian labourers who work within the Green Line among others. For
more on the demands of Palestinian liberation, see: Presented by Sari Nusayb, “The Palestinians'
Fourteen Demands” Journal of Palestien Studies, 17, no.13 (1988), 63-5. ; Mazin Qumsiyeh, Popular
Resistance in Palestine: a History of Hope and Empowerment, (London: Pluto Press, 2011). For more on
the struggle employed in achieving these goals, see: Yezid Sayigh, ‘Armed struggle and state formation’,
Journal of Palestine Studies, 26, no.4, (1997), 17-32.
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powers (or powers contesting hegemony) in the centre of this work is fundamental. Therefore the
first case will examine several blocs with state-building aspirations in the twilight of British
empire and interrogate how these blocs interacted with two seminal moments in the conflict: the
1936 Arab Revolt and the War of 1948. The following period is quite straightforward in the
sense that the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank were under direct administration
of Egypt and Jordan respectively, and hence an analysis of these administrations will be
conducted. The rest of this work will shift and focus specifically on the Gulf’s relationship with
the conflict, firstly through interaction with the displaced Palestinian diaspora and secondly
through its relationship with Israeli militarism. The Gulf, and specifically Saudi Arabia, has been
centred in this analysis due to their status as purveyors of American regional hegemony and for
their unparalleled capacity to mobilise economic resources for political ends.12

Questions and Hypotheses
This finally leads to the central question of this analysis: how have the Arab states realised
political and economic utility from the extension of this conflict and how has their behaviour in
the materialisation of these opportunities led to the extension of the conflict? The question is not
one that has often received direct attention. Moreover, when examined, the agency of the Arab
actors is usually downplayed as they are portrayed as simply reactive to external circumstances.
But the literature, despite its limitations, actually identifies an array of ways in which these states
have benefited from the occupation. If they play some part in maintaining the cycle which has

12

For an analysis of American imperial endeavours in the Middle East and the deployment of Gulf capital
as a method of hegemonic consolidation, see: Adam Hanieh, Lineages of Revolt: Issues of Contemporary
Capitalism in the Middle East (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013).
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devastated the Palestinians, and I will argue they are, then uncovering the underlying motive
forces of their actions becomes fundamental in articulating a more lucid approach to one of the
most pressing humanitarian crises of our current moment.
Using the aforementioned primary question of the analysis, there needs to be some
derivation of subsidiary questions by which the research can be broken down. The first question
is: what are the prospective political gains that can be procured from the state of conflict in the
Palestinian territories? There are forms of political capital that are mined from utilisation of the
conflict, both domestically and internationally. The perpetual state of conflict constantly allows
for exceptional political measures to be employed. The concocted image of the Israeli enemy,
and the threat of the spillover of political violence resulting from the occupation, have been
relentlessly invoked by the Arab states as a method of shifting the discourse.13 The following
question is: are there economic benefits that are realised from the empowerment of the Israeli
state and the marginalisation of the Palestinian people? This question has to be posited due to the
choice of framework (see the section on framework). Understanding the full scope of the benefits
derived from the conflict has to be established and hence an inquiry into the potential economic
gains is quite an obvious consequent step. There is sufficient evidence of the positivity of that
claim and with there being a considerable literature devoted to the ways in which profits are
realised inside this conflict (see the review of the political economy literature), then it stands to
reason that other actors may also benefit. Opportunities for accumulation are regularly being
realised in the sectors of energy, arms, reconstruction and technology.14 In previous decades, the
13

Hassan Barari, Israelism: Arab Scholarship on Israel, a Critical Assessment (Reading: Ithaca Press,
2009), 105.
14
Ray Bush and Habib Ayeb, eds., Accumulation by encroachment in the Arab Mashreq (London: Zed
Books, 2012), 45. ; Hannes Baumann, “Lebanon's economic dependence on Saudi Arabia is dangerous”,
The Wahsington Post, last modified December 7, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2017/12/07/hariri-is-back-as-lebanons-prime-minister-heres-how-saudi-economic-influence-stillshapes-lebanese-politics/?utm_term=.9f549c179905 ; “Israel's drone dealers”, Al Jazeera, last modified
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dispossession of the Palestinian people also allowed for the acquisition of value, both in the
forms of land (and all that entails in the economic sense) and labour.15
The third question is whether or not there is a history of cooperative measures between
the Arab states and Israel or Israeli factions. If so, what is the nature of this cooperation? This
question is intended to identify prospective alternative motives to the actions of the Arab states
in the larger conflict. Moving away from a conception of a regional politics in which
opportunities for political and economic aggrandisement come to be by happenstance, this
analysis seeks to identify the agency in the creation and exploitation of these opportunities. Since
this analysis is functioning with a skepticism of public stances, scrutiny of actual political
behaviour is integral. There is a substantive quantity of instances of direct cooperation that
indicate that there is a more functional relationship between the two parties than is often
depicted. Security cooperation has actually been noted quite vigorously in the literature.
Economically, however, very little has been articulated with regards to the ways in which Israel
functions as part of the regional economic structure. This is largely due to the performative
boycott that, in reality, has quite consistently been circumvented through a variety of
techniques.16 Moreover, there is a substantial history of diplomatic offerings between the states
in question and Israel that made no note of resolving any of the foremost political ambitions of
the Palestinians (e.g. establishment of statehood and right of return).17 And this culminates in the

May 01, 2014,
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2014/04/201442911431250545.html?xif=.
15
Antoine Zahlan and Rosemarie Zahlan (1977). “The Palestinian Future: Education and Manpower”
Journal of Palestine Studies 6(4), 104. ; Mark Zeitoun, Power and water in the Middle East : the hidden
politics of the Palestinian-Israeli water conflict (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008).
16
Martin Weiss (2017). “Arab League Boycott of Israel” Congressional Research Service, 4. ; “The Badly
Kept Secret of Israel's Trade Throughout the Muslim World” last modified January 19, 2012,
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/1.5167882
17
Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians (Massachusetts:
South End Press, 1999), 134.
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final question: with three previous questions in mind, is there enough to establish culpability of
the Arab states in the perpetuation of the Israeli occupation? This is the most ambitious objective
aim of this analysis; to attempt to reconfigure current conceptualisations of the role of the Arab
states in the conflict. With there being such a plentitude of benefits that they are capable of
accruing from the stasis of the situation, in addition to the measures of collaboration that have
been undertaken, the claim will be posited that they are directly active in its perpetuation.

Literature Review
The literature pertaining to this topic can be divided into three categories.
The first includes scholarly work that directly attempts to answer the same analytical
questions that I will be using in my analysis. Within this bracket are two distinct sub-categories.
The most prominent of which is the strategic studies perspective which, for the most part, does
not entertain anything beyond the sphere of states. The second is distinct for making a more
concrete theoretical link between the realms of international policy and domestic politics.
Neither sub-category provides a particularly substantive answer either due to analytical blind
spots or to a lack of theoretical rigour.
Beyond this first general category lies two more strands that do not directly engage the
questions but heavily interact with the same concepts while utilising analyses that overlap with
mine both spatially and temporally. The first strand of scholarship is that of the critical history of
Israel, both from the revisionist school and the more contemporary Palestinian authorship on
critically historicising the Israeli state. It is important to note that this school is most pressingly
concerned with Israel and the Zionist movement. Excluding the actual Palestinians, the Arab
actors are, despite moments of prominence, largely peripheral. Nevertheless, the commitment to
11

approach the general situation through a critical lens makes it essential in establishing my own
critique.
Finally, the last theoretical perspective that I will discuss is that of political economy. The
political economy texts are exceptional in that even when centralising the analysis towards a
single state or a certain group within society, interlinkages domestically and internationally are
still explored. The frameworks of political science that posit that singular actors can be analysed
independently of global social forces do not spill over into political economy and the role of the
Arab states is always integral to the analyses of the political economies of Israel and Palestine.

Realism, Strategic Studies and the State
The strategic studies approach, which is nominally associated with a realist international
relations framework, to this question is extremely pervasive both in academic and policy-making
circles. It is, for the most part, internally consistent and thus all its iterations tend to be extremely
homogeneous. Despite that, the primary theses of this framework are regurgitated with extreme
frequency despite there being very little to be added in terms of analysis. Effectively the entire
idea behind these studies can be summarised with the phrase “state security”. Arab cooperation
(particularly that of the Gulf Cooperation Council) with Israel is constantly expressed through
the lens of shared security threats and their relationship has organically developed since “Israel
and the Sunni Arab states have the same enemies—the Iranian regime, Syria’s Assad regime,
Hamas, and Hezbollah—and, as the Arabs have said since ancient times, ‘the enemy of my
enemy is my friend.’”18 The relationship is consistently described as one born of pragmatic

18

Michael Totten (2016). “The New Arab-Israeli Alliance” World Affairs 179(2), 31.
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necessity, a compulsion conceived due to the regional balance of power. Ruptures in the
decades-long Arab League policy of dealing with Israel have started taking place among several
of the member states.19 Rabi and Mueller effectively summarise the thesis of this school when
they describe the GCC as possessing “a strong interest in a resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian
conflict, viewing it as a long-sought bridgehead to regional stability. Like most of the Arab
world, the GCC leaders did not view Israel as a legitimate state but believed that the goal of a
Middle East without Israel was unrealistic.”20 Reaching a resolution to the issue is seen as a way
of being able to shift the strategic focus entirely to greater security threats than Palestinian
insurgency, such as Iran and The Islamic State, particularly with the turbulent conditions
established by the Arab Spring.21
The primary insufficiency in these analyses lies in the complete absence of an
examination of the processes and relations that are not given public prominence. Formal postures
and diplomatic engagements are taken at face value, and thus so much of the literature is
dedicated to scrutinising every public act without really identifying the underlying propulsions of
these acts. Even with Egypt, who already signed a peace accord with Israel, the relation has been
characterised as transforming from ‘cold peace’, one of necessity, to a ‘strategic peace’, one of

Uzi Rabi, “Qatar Relations with Israel: Challenging Arab and Gulf Norms,” Middle East Journal 63, no. 3
(2009): 444– 7. ; Hady Amr, Ian Lustick, Riad Kahwaji, Chas W. Freeman, Jr. “New Approaches to IsraelPalestine Peace: Can Regional Powers Make a Difference?” Middle East Policy 24, no. 2 (2017), 5-32 ;
Itamar Rabinovich, The lingering conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948-2012, (New York:
Brookings Institution Press, 2012) ; Shmuel Sandler, “The Arab Spring and the linkage between Israel’s
domestic and foreign policies” in The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security : Domestic and International
Ramifications ed. Efraim Inbar (London: Routledge, 2013), 128-144. ; Efraim Inbar, “The Strategic
Implications for Israel” in The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security : Domestic and International
Ramifications ed. Efraim Inbar (London: Routledge, 2013), 145-165.
20
Uzi Rabi and Chelsi Mueller (2017). “The Gulf Arab states and Israel since 1967: from ‘no negotiation’
to tacit cooperation” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44(4), 583.
21
Philipp Amour, “Israel, the Arab Spring, and the unfolding regional order in the Middle East: a strategic
assessment” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 44, no.3 (2017), 293-309.
19
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shared security interests.22 Guzansky, in spite of his utilised framework, recognises the benefits
of contradictory public and private stances stating that “The Arab monarchies in the Gulf are
currently beneﬁting from the fact that covert, unofﬁcial relations allow them to enjoy the
advantages of ties with Israel without having to pay a price in public opinion, which has become
more vocal since the outbreak of the Arab Spring.”23 And yet despite this, declarations of enmity
prior to the contemporary moment are still treated as sincere while moments of cooperation are
treated as either accidental or obligatory, largely with an emphasis on strengthening security and
reducing conflict.24 It is the theoretical limitations of a framework that understands power, and
by extension security, as the only currency of global politics that leads to such facile analysis.
Wealth is completely disregarded as something that is inherently interconnected with power.
How Gulf states, whose only regional or global relevance stems from their access to oil, natural
gas and the money they receive from these exports, can be analysed without any sort of
examination of wealth is frankly difficult to understand.
The second glaring inadequacy of these analyses can be found in the macroscopic flaws
of their attempted historicizations. There is a widely recognised surge in Arab-Israeli cooperation
in the contemporary moment but with almost no attempt to contextualise it beyond effectively
causally linking everything to the Iranian revolution and apprehension of its diffusion.25 As will
become more apparent in the remainder of this literature review, the history of Arab cooperation
extends far beyond the moments that are fetishised in this corpus. Instead of constructing a

Amnon Aran & Rami Ginat, “Revisiting Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Israel under Mubarak: From
Cold Peace to Strategic Peace" Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no.4 (2014), 556-583.
23
Yoel Guzansky (2015). “Israel and the Arab Gulf states: from tacit cooperation to reconciliation?” Israel
Affairs 21(1), 142.
24
Hermann Frederick Eilts, “The United States and Egypt” in The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp
David ed. William B. Quandt, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988), 111–50.
25
Yoel Guzansky (2011). “Tacit Allies: Israel and the Arab Gulf States” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs
5(1), 9.
22
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comprehensive historical framework that recognises this, the literature merely interacts with the
period in which cooperation is brazenly apparent. Again, it is the absence of a distinction
between what is displayed on the surface and what is concealed beneath it that leads to such
misguided historical understandings.

Construction of the Enemy and Internal Hegemony
There is an alternative theoretical perspective that seeks to explain the need for an ongoing
Israeli occupation; that of instrumentalization of the conflict. “While the instrumentalisation of
foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, has been adduced to serve the purpose of political
violence and oppression domestically,” writes Ewan Stein, “the nature of instrumentalisation can
be further unpacked and ‘deepened’ to include the ways in which social movements
instrumentalise foreign policy.”26 Analysis of the discourse, emanating from both state
representatives and oppositional actors, inside the Arab world pertaining to the conflict with
Israel is persistently linked to the shaping of domestic politics. Stein and Hassan Barari both
identify the ways in which state hegemony is maintained by invocation of the Israeli threat as
well as the methods of employing exceptional (and often illegal) political acts through
securitisation vis-a-vis Israel.27 Barari even exhibits cogency regarding the instrumentalisation of
the conflict for the sake of preserving approval externally in the larger ‘Arab world’, stating that
“Bombastic statements slamming Israel have been a first-class tactic to ameliorate the regimes’
images within, and among, the Arab masses.”28

26

Ewan Stein, Representing Israel in Modern Egypt: Ideas, Intellectuals and Foreign Policy from Nasser
to Mubarak (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 192.
27
Hassan Barari, Israelism : Arab Scholarship on Israel, a Critical Assessment (Reading: Ithaca Press,
2009), 105; Stein, Representing Israel, 193.
28
Barari, Israelism, 103.
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The creation of this discourse and the embedding of the threat of the Israeli enemy into
the national consciousness is seen as a tool by which legitimacy is attained for the Arab
regimes.29 Internal legitimacy for what are conceptually understood as autocratic regimes across
the Arab world is the primary end that moves domestic politics. The conflict has provided
multiple opportunities for this strengthening of legitimacy, both through framing of the security
threat of the Israeli military as well as the Palestinian refugees.30
The limitations of this school of thought comes from the inability to understand politics
structurally. The Arab actors are perceived as merely being acted upon and only affecting the
internal relations. There is a coherent comprehension of the ways in which the Arab-Israeli
conflict benefits the states within the region but no acknowledgement that there is an active
perpetuation. Would it not stand to reason that preserving this golden egg laying goose is
something that they would seek to enforce? But these analyses fail to understand the dialectical
relation of international and domestic politics. There is no singular causal force emerging from
international politics pressing down on the internal political realm, but rather two simultaneous
forces both constantly shaping the realities of the political structure.

Critical Historicization
To move beyond the problem-solving approaches of realism and strategic studies that merely
contend with analysis of the surface, there emerges a need to examine the more critical

29

Michael C. Hudson, Arab politics : the search for legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).
; Avraham Shela, Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict : Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional
Order, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997).
30
Shela, Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict : Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order, 67 &
Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza : bureaucracy, authority, and the work of rule, 1917-1967 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2008), 128.
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contributions within the literature. There is a rich tradition of critical history of the PalestinianIsraeli conflict that is linked by a notable distinction between what appears to be true and the
actual reality that was generally started within the revisionist school. Simha Flapan’s The Birth
of Israel: Myths and Realities was the harbinger of this tradition of scholarship and it focuses on
dispelling the narrow historical reading that places Arab cooperation with Israel as a
phenomenon that simply emerged unexpectedly in the 1970’s and beyond. The fragmentation of
the Arabs, their reluctance to partake in armed conflict with the Zionist force and the diplomatic
relations between Arab and Jewish leaders are all among the central themes of the work and they
attempt to recontextualise the traditional frameworks of the war of 1948.31 The work of the new
historians of Israel has extrapolated on this with Avi Shlaim’s Collusion Across the Jordan: King
Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine focusing heavily on breaking
down the appearance of unified Arab hostility and identifying the variety of interests.32 Maxime
Rodinson makes not of just how central the Arabs were to this process, stating that “Several
decades earlier it might have been possible to carry through the Zionist plan on the level the
political Zionists envisaged through deals between a Zionist Organization, endowed with great
resources, and governments, essentially those of the European imperialist powers. Unfortunately
for them, the stage for putting this plan into effect arrived at a time when nationalism was taking
shape in the Moslem countries too.”33 Hence, any examination of the essential questions of this
analysis cannot begin at an arbitrary point several decades after 1948. It has to, unsurprisingly,
begin at the beginning.
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Beyond 1948, there are extensive historical accounts that seek to distinguish between
commonly accepted narratives and the conflicting realities. Accounts of the 1967 war that
distinguish between the conveyed media perception of concerted Arab belligerence leading to an
evitable eruption and the actual diplomacy deployed to deter war are of particular relevance to
this analysis.34 In such moments, the primacy of certain interests becomes apparent and
particularly in 1967, the escalation of rhetoric was contrasted by a very cautious approach in the
processes that were actually enacted. 35 Ilan Pappe’s analysis in A History of Modern Palestine :
One Land, Two Peoples also examines other moments in which this contrast became apparent
and is one of the few works to actually make use of Arab sources, a distinct limitation of the
revisionist school as a whole.36 And this is not only present within the domestic and regional
landscapes of the conflict but is also evident in the instances in which there is a meeting of
various global forces, such as the Israeli intervention within Lebanon in the 70’s and the 80’s.37
The period is of particular relevance due to the time in which it took place (in concomitance with
the Egyptian-Israeli peace, as well as immediately after the 1973 oil embargo) as well as the
global interests that formed its outcomes .
There are substantial limitations to this strand of the literature. Primarily the narratives
that are centred in order to construct the respective arguments of the revisionist historians are
predominantly Israeli. Palestinian and other Arab voices are neglected in forming these historical
outlooks. Moreover, a lot of these works are quite dated and a lot of new information has come
to light since. Critical historicization as part of a framework is, however, an important starting
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point to an analysis of the role of the Arab states in maintaining the occupation. Arab solidarity
has frequently been the discursively constructed image. Moving beyond this presented image and
identifying the ways in which political capital is constantly realised through the
instrumentalisation of the perpetual state of conflict and of the disenfranchisement of the
Palestinian people is the fundamental ambition of this analysis. The contribution to this
framework comes in the form of centralising the Arab actors, not merely designating them partial
status.

Contemporary Histories
There are more updated histories that focus on the same issues employed by the revisionists but
centre Palestinian scholarship in their narratives while also examining issues pertaining to capital
and class in a more explicit way. Moreover, they identify the specifics of Zionist capitalism, a
mode of production still beholden to the forces of the market yet circumscribed within a
framework of settler-colonialism and racism.38 Capitalism as established in settler-colonial
societies becomes predicated on establishing a dominant state nationalism that undermines the
existent indigenous nationalisms, to the extent of foregoing what may appear as the most
‘economically rational’ prospects. This is because as Abdo explains “(T)he imposition of the
political ideology of the settler-colonial power over the colonized becomes of paramount
significance.”39 The realisation of this political economic structure is clarified through the forms
of racist obstacles into class integration that prevented the Palestinians from becoming ingrained
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in that landscape. The British colonial presence was vital in facilitating this through the gifting of
essential state projects to Jewish concessionaries and contractors, who then enforced the
exclusion of Arab workers. Within state projects, Jewish workers were privileged either through
substantially higher representation or vastly vastly higher remuneration for identical work
performed by Arab workers. The state was thus in effect prior to the creation of Israel “largely
used as a mechanism for the reproduction and expansion of the European (Jewish) capitalist
class.”40 Fundamentally, however, though state formation (specifically of a settler-colonial state)
occasionally predominated class formation, it was only within the established socioeconomic
boundaries.41 Simultaneously, this transition was facilitated by those who Sherene Seikaly
designates ‘men of capital’, who did not succeed in establishing a national economy of their
own, for whom the social ordering that they “prioritized worked to contain social mobility,
silence dissent, and stunt the potential for revolutionary change.”42
Following the establishment of the state of Israel, the settler-colonial nature of the society
continued to define the political economy of Israel. A substantial distinction exists between
colonial constructions of local economies and settler-colonial ones in that the former is propelled
by the indegenous labour force whereas the latter is predicated on the expulsion of that
class.43Thus the burgeoning social relations within the Israeli political economy were constituted
by a historic bloc comprised of the Labour Zionist movement and migrant Jewish workers.44
This was characterised by state-led industrialisation and the investment of labour-intensive
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projects that simultaneously strengthened the nationalistic elements of Israeli society while
ensuring that incoming migrants could immediately occupy the spaces vacated through the
dispersal of the indigenous population.45

Globalising the Conflict
There has always been a global dimension to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The creation of the Israeli
state has been not only been predicated on the political administration of Britain and the influx of
labour coming from outside but also substantial capital injections from Europe and the United
States.46 Political economy perspectives convey this global dimension due to the tacit
understanding that the capitalist social order is built on nodes connected by linkages that keep
the entire system running, particularly in a neo-liberal moment that Israel and Palestine have not
been exempt from.47 It is therefore instructive to examine works built on such perspectives, not
only to understand the global politics of the conflict but the regional politics with which this
analysis is specifically concerned. One such way in which this strain of the literature identifies
the regionilisation and the globalisation of the conflict is within the political economy of the
Palestinian territories, wherein the flows of trade and labour with neighbouring states are
extremely pronounced and heavily determinant of its condition. There is a cognition within the
literature of some of the roles the Arab states play in, at the very least, exacerbating the stasis of
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the situation. The de-development of the territories has a consistent recognition of the restrictive
behaviours, mainly of Egypt and Jordan, towards exchange of subsistence commodities as well
as capital.48 Sara Roy links this to the political by outlining the “punitive measures undertaken by
Egypt in concordance with Israel.”49 Additionally, there is a substantive examination within the
literature of migration flows from Palestine towards, primarily, the Gulf.50 The Palestine
diaspora comprises a subsection of the migrant working class within the Gulf and has served a
disciplining function in order to facilitate Gulf capital’s accumulation.51 Other links between
Israel-Palestine and the Arab states in the political economy corpus do not only take place in the
realm of labour, but also of capital.52 Particularly, the Weapondollar–Petrodollar Coalition
provides a lens by which the macro-side of regional politics can be understood and vitally, it
provides a concretely political understanding to the quintessential resource within the Middle
East.53
Theoretically, there is substantial groundwork that would be beneficial to erect a
framework by which the Arab role in the perpetuation of the occupation can be understood.
There is frequently an absence of direct interaction with this query and the fact that the majority
of useful material are intended as analyses either of Israel or the Palestinian territories speaks to
this.
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Framework & Methodology
International political economy, as a framework of international relations, is an approach by
which the studies of power and wealth can be intertwined. It is difficult to conceive of a lens by
which wealth can be abstracted away entirely from politics. Within what is arguably the most
utilised framework in the discipline, liberalism, there is a very concrete acknowledgement of the
role of economics in the affairs of the international political sphere. Even in the hard security
conceptualisations of realist doctrine there is an increasing recognition of a link between money
and power, if only in the sense that money allows for the procurement and the facilitation of the
attainment of the tools by which war can be waged or thwarted. Political economy, therefore, is
not exogenous to international relations but rather an internal reorientation of the analytical
scope. The linkages between the political and economic are not treated merely as accidental
appendages to the state system, but are recognised as an endemic consequence of our
contemporary global social organisation. Hence, shining a revelatory light on these linkages
becomes paramount to the comprehension of how actors behave in the global sphere.
In order to begin this venture it is first necessary to identify the structure by which the
global social order is organised in the contemporary moment. The invocation of the term ‘social
order’ is intended to identify a larger structure wherein the political and economic exist. It is
redundant to examine the anarchy of nation-states in a vacuum as it is equally redundant to do so
with the system of international trade. The totality within which both exist and by which all
social life is governed is that of capitalism. Capitalism is a method of social organisation unique
and distinct from all others that preceded it. At its core and what differentiates it from all other
social formations is the ubiquitous production of all things for exchange, as opposed to use.
23

Whereas in previous societies some commodities existed and markets were a prospective venue
for their sale and attainment, in capitalism commodity production is imperative and allencompassing. In order to attain the means of living, the majority of the population are required
to sell the one commodity in their position; their ability to work. In direct contradiction, a
minority of proprietors are required to utilise what they also possess; money. The circulation of
that money can only be justified if it yields more than its original worth. And thus capital is
conceived as “it comes out of circulation, enters into it again, preserves and multiplies itself
within circulation, emerges from it with an increased size, and starts the same cycle again and
again.”54 A tether is thus created between those who sell their ability to work and those with the
capital required to purchase it. And hence a complete and utter subjugation to the market takes
form, wherein all actors produce for exchange. Ellen Meiksins-Wood expresses this phenomenon
as such: “This market dependence gives the market an unprecedented role in capitalist societies,
as not only a simple mechanism of exchange or distribution but the principal determinant and
regulator of social reproduction.”55
A variety of behaviours and processes are ingrained into the very fabric of capitalism.
Preceding the establishment of the property relations that dictate the behaviour of the class of
unpropertied labourers and their capital-possessing counterparts are the processes of what is
identified as primitive accumulation, the history of which is written “in letters of blood and
fire.”56 These processes constitute the encroachment of communal lands, their private enclosure
and the forceful dispossession of the majority of the population of their means of reproducing
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themselves.57 These processes do not have an end point but are constantly taking form in order to
entrench capitalist relations. Once they are sufficiently established in order for a national market
to exist, the logic of capital takes form through “the imperatives of competition, accumulation,
and profit-maximization, and hence a constant systemic need to develop the productive forces.”58
These mechanisms, buried into the core of capitalist relations, propel the expansion and growth
by which this form of social organisation becomes diffuse and eventually dominant on a global
level.
Capitalist growth is not optional. Stasis in the capitalist order rings a death knell and
hence expansion is constantly in motion. This manifests spatially in the form of imperialism.59
Imperial capitalist expansion is distinct in that it must transform the society that it pervades. Precapitalist imperialism did not face a compulsion to achieve this with provinces engulfed by the
empire often simply being required to pay tribute to the core. This did not necessarily require a
concrete change in the way the productive forces of the society were organised. Capitalist
expansion, however, requires the spread of the processes of encroachment, dispossession and
proletarianisation.60 Much the same as the domestic establishment of capitalist relations, global
imperialism is equally violent, especially so in societies previously unblemished by the
disciplining forces of a central political sovereign. Either through the threat of violence or by the
enactment of physical violence, the core capitalist society imposes the new form of social
organisation onto the peripheral society.
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The pervasive nature of capitalism instigates new contradictions that also require violent
resolutions. There is a tacit acknowledgement of an in-built tendency for crises to erupt within
capitalism, even from most proponents. The notion of gluts, originating from Thomas Malthus,
revolves around the detrimental cost of capitalist growth. Subtracting the extreme class
allegiances Malthus infused within his analysis, capitalist accumulation was problematic due to
an inherent inability to realise the expansive tendencies of the class of capitalists. An imbalance
of production and consumption would come to be by litigating too much power to this faction of
society as they would constantly seek to invest and reinvest in productive functions. Moreover,
when labour-saving capital is invested in, the purchasing power of the labouring class would
diminish even further and thus an imbalance of the aggregate supply and the aggregate demand
of the economy would erupt. In order to resolve this contradiction Malthus came to recognise the
need for unproductive consumption in order to restabilise the economy. In his words “There
must therefore be a considerable class of persons who have both the will and power to consume
more material wealth than they produce, or the mercantile classes could not continue profitably
to produce so much more than they consume.”61 In order to attempt to resolve this inherent
contradiction within capitalist production, spatial expansion once again emerges as a necessary
process. Situating a class of unproductive consumers from outside the society in question not
only allows for the process of accumulation to reignite but it also does so without ceding power
to the other existent internal classes, such as the labouring class or those who own the land. This
external class of consumers can either voluntarily provide the money by which this contradiction
can be resolved, as in the form of a faction of comprador elites, or they can be violently coerced
into purchasing the commodities emerging from the core.62
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Unproductive spending as a tenet of the capitalist social order has existed in orthodox
theory for a considerable amount of time. It was John Maynard Keynes who propelled this notion
into the mainstream and for decades state policy was oriented around it. Keynes thought this
‘wasteful loan expenditure’ to be an effective method by which excess savings that had not been
converted into investment could be absorbed, and also as a stimulant of employment. Though not
entirely intended to invoke this, Keynes himself was actually aware of how this could be
translated into a justification for militarism stating that “Pyramid-building, earthquakes, even
wars may serve to increase wealth, if the education of our statesmen on the principles of the
classical economics stands in the way of anything better.”63 In fact militarism has not been
merely a potential choice by which capitalist accumulation is realised; rather, it has been
historically “the greatest bulwark of capitalism.”64 Militarism possesses a twofold character in
the perpetuation of capitalist relations: a productive aspect and consumptive aspect. The
production of means of militarism is an avenue in which stagnation can be averted due to the
perpetually escalating nature of the industry.65 Conversely, the consumption of militaristic
commodities serves a vital function in alleviating the problems associated with the infinite nature
of capitalist growth. Despite constantly needing expansion in order to reproduce itself, capitalism
faces a very definitive obstacle in the form of the finite nature of the planet. By exhausting the
destructive capacities of weaponry, this contradiction can be overcome, or at least shifted
temporally. Consumption of arms allows for the continuation of the cycle of accumulation as
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well as create future avenues for the realisation of profit. Construction and reconstruction are
facilitated by the destructive capacities of war.
The creation of political economies of war can frequently prolong the violence due to the
avenues of profit that the war provides. The emergence of smuggling networks, either of
displaced peoples or of looted resources, often ensures that the actors involved, whether states or
non-state militias, actively try to prevent the resolution of the conflict.66 Readily exploitable
labour in the form of refugees becomes highly coveted for neighbouring states. Moreover, war
can also be an engine for political and social transformation. Such political functions of war
include “weakening a political opposition; gaining electoral advantage; absorbing the energies of
discontented groups; and sabotaging an emerging democracy.”67 Social transformation in the
form of the reconfiguration of class relations and the reorganisation of historic blocs is also made
more tenable by both the threat of war and war itself. In the contemporary moment, the process
of financialisation and privatisation are constantly being enforced and in the face of resistance,
the social transformation can only come into being through force.68
The rebuilding phase that follows any destructive military venture has also been a boon
for capitalism. Not only does it provide an economic opportunity through the creation of pockets
that surplus capital can penetrate and be absorbed, but it serves a very distinct political function
in the establishment of tethers. Reconstruction allows for the establishment of particular
structures that entrench either subservience to those providing the capital or dependency. The
influx of capital can take three forms (aid, investment and credit), all three of which possess a
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highly charged political character. Aid frequently contains a conditionality by which the apparent
loss of money can be recompensed.69 One such mechanism by which this is achieved is by
simply requiring the recipients to expend the aid in the domestic markets of the donor country.
Alternatively, aid can be predicated by the condition of being strictly for military purposes, in
which case the prospect of the recurrence of destruction and reconstruction becomes more
pronounced. Investment differs in that it does not need to be made conditional but it can be
implemented in methods that do not benefit the developmental capacities of the recipient
country. In both cases, the political autonomy of the recipient is compromised. With credit, this
is even more overt. Indebtedness tips the dynamic of power between any two actors and allows
the creditor a foothold within the political landscape of the debtor.70 The end-point of all three
forms, however, is largely the same; it provides an opportunity for the perpetuation of the
circulation of capital as well as its extension into the future.

Themes and Chapters
There are three main themes that I intend on engaging through this international political
economy framework to derive a substantive answer to the questions of the research. The first
theme, chronologically, is the contribution of the Arab leaders in the initial appropriation of land
and the expulsion of the Palestinians. There are existing answers to this in the literature but as
part of the historicization it needs to be elaborated on and contextualised within the larger
framework of the analysis. The second theme is about the ways in which the constantly
expanding military threat has been a domestic boon for the hegemony of internal historic blocs
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both ideationally but also materially. The third theme is the benefits of access to a dispossessed
stateless class of workers for the Arab states. Each of these three themes will be applied to
specific phenomena in each chapter of this analysis.
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will be the first substantive analytical chapter and
it will provide a historical perspective on the formation of the power relations that would go on
to characterise the nature of this conflict for several decades. The dispossession of the Palestinian
population, the creation of the Israeli state, the seizure of lands and the administration of the
resultant refugee crisis will be the central aspects of this analysis, and thus the chapter will focus
on the period between 1936 and 1967. The Arab Revolt of 1936 is chosen as the starting point
due to it being a pronounced expression of the class dynamics inside Palestine and how they
interplayed with the regional actors that would be vital in shaping the events of 1948. The
chapter will then move on to a thorough examination of the origins of the war of 1948 and their
consequences with an attempt to reconstrue the existing historical literature on this period
through a political economy perspective. Hence an analysis of the resources at stake (i.e. land,
water and labour) will be conducted with cooperation between Jordan and Israel firmly in the
foreground. Having established this context, the analysis will then shift to the administration of
Gaza and the West Bank in the immediate aftermath of the dispossession up until 1967, when
substantial shifts in the dynamics of the entire region would take place. The purpose of this
examination is to shed light on both the realisation of regional class interests at the expense of
the Palestinian national movement, be it in Egypt or Jordan. The appropriation of land by the
Hashemites in Jordan, the exploitation of the displaced labour force, the instrumentalisation of
the Palestinian political movement either as a source of legitimacy or a threat to national
security, and the establishment of relations of dependency as well as the inhibition of
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developmental capacites are the aspects that arose in this moment that put in place many of the
conditions that linger on to this day in this conflict.
Chapter 3 will address Palestinian migrant labour and how it was utilised by the Gulf
states. The political character of the treatment of this class (either through absorption or
expulsion) is fundamental to the analysis. As in the previous chapter, a contextualisation within
regional relations between the Gulf states and Israel will be embedded in order to display the
ways in which these events either tacitly or overtly entrenched Palestinian displacement and
Israeli occupation. The chapter will begin in 1948 and end in 1990, when Palestinian migration
as a largescale project effectively died with the events of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The analysis will be concluded with a synthesis of the three main themes of the thesis,
integrating them all to develop a contemporary perspective on the conflict, and where it may be
heading. The conclusion will take into account the other alternative and prospective avenues
from which Arab capital and their state representatives may benefit, and how the current
landscape is shaping these interests.
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Chapter 2 - Collusion Pre-1948 & Successive Administration
Those who examine the situation in Palestine as a confrontation of blocs, as is frequently found
in the aforementioned strategic studies literature, can only do so by utilising a blinkered lens that
disregards stratification within the respective societies. In their eyes all that can be seen are states
and associations of states. But that is a far cry from the reality of Middle Eastern societies.
Inheriting a colonial structure of elites and subservients, and then conceiving their own budding
forms of capitalism, the Arab world has always been internally divided along political and
economic lines. Hence the view of an overriding will of Arab unity, by which a convergence of
interests along the entire region comes to be, against an abstract Zionist occupation is simply a
misrepresentation. From the onset of the formation of a political Arab national identity, there
have been divisions within Arab society which have facilitated the Israeli seizure of Palestine as
well as inhibited a Palestinian national movement.
As Avi Shlaim argues when describing one of the primary Zionist strategies in securing
the eventual outcome of independence in 1948, “the attempt to bypass the Palestine Arabs and
forge direct links with rulers of the Arab states became a constant feature of Zionist diplomacy in
the 1930s and 1940s.”71 This was a highly intuitive approach for three main reasons. Primarily,
the ruling elites of most of the countries neighbouring Palestine at that stage were either directly
selected by the colonial European powers governing the respective countries or indirectly toeing
a line that would prevent them from becoming antagonistic towards the colonial powers. This, as
will be examined in this chapter, led to extremely tenuous commitments to the Palestinian
national movement or active attempts to eliminate its political character. Secondly, whereas the
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presence of a very directly confrontational Zionist movement had galvanised the Palestinian
inhabitants into organising a somewhat united front, the neighbouring Arab societies did not
have particularly pervasive or mature nationalistic tendencies. This meant that fragmentation
within these societies was quite rife and hence finding actors that were amenable to Zionist
political ambitions was possible. This was particularly prevalent in Egypt with a nascent class of
financiers becoming enticed by the prospects of partnership with their Jewish counterparts who
had access to foreign resources that otherwise would have been unreachable. And thirdly, and
perhaps most significantly, due to these divisions and the existence of a clear hierarchy within
these societies, the ruling elites, new to the concept of state-making, had a strong drive towards
expansion and consolidation of land and resources. These ambitions superseded any sort of
transnational Arab allegiances and the increasing Zionist foothold in Palestine was seen as an
attempt to profiteer from a potential fragmentation of that territory, as will be demonstrated
through Jordan’s absorption of the productive capacities of the West Bank and Egypt’s
administration of Gaza in a way that enforced the legitimacy of the ruling class but deleteriously
affected the developmental prospects of the Strip.

The 1936 Arab Revolt
The Arab revolt that erupted in Palestine in 1936 was arguably the first large scale manifestation
of a regional conflict that has been ongoing ever since and, in many ways, it aptly establishes the
patterns of behaviour that several of these actors have continued to exhibit. Of specific interest to
this analysis was the highly opportunistic pressure exerted by the rulers of the neighbouring Arab
countries in quelling the revolt. The revolt had erupted because of continued grievances with
British mandatory administration that had previously instigated minor episodes of violence
33

throughout the 1920’s. The Peel Commission of 1937 identified numerous causes for the
outbreak but they can roughly be summarised in two primary points. The first cause was the
increasing Jewish presence in Palestine, mainly in the form of increased immigration (fueled by
European persecution) and transfers of land from Arab ownership to Jewish ownership. This
general concern was heightened by a general suspicion of the British administration who were
perceived by the Palestinian Arabs as facilitating this shift. The second cause was the stagnation
of the plans to realise an Arab national entity within the Palestinian territory. Attributed to a
regional build-up of national independence movements, it was somewhat ironic that it would
actually be the regional leaders who would provide a substantial thrust in trying to end these
hostilities.
The reason for this becomes transparent when examining the nature of the revolt,
specifically the fact that it consisted mainly of a general strike. The revolt was not localised in a
particular sector or locale within Palestine; rather, it was pervasive.72 That is not to say that there
was a complete unity in the movement, since there was still a very stark division between the
elites within Palestine and the masses. The Arab Higher Committee, which was formed in
response to the general strike, was founded by the heads of prominent Palestinian clans and their
representative political parties. Formally the Arab Higher Committee would support the strike
despite actively trying to prevent it from expanding to its full capacity. The Committee sought to
navigate a path in which it could earn the goodwill of the Palestinians while not sacrificing the
political and economic influence to which it already had access. The two main factions of the
Palestinian ruling elite, the Husaynis and the Nashashibis, prevented government employees,
mayors and municipal workers from joining the strike since these were the avenues from which
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their power derived. Similarly, members of the committee who possessed substantial economic
assets, such as landowners, merchants and financiers, started calling for an end to the strike once
their personal interests became compromised.73 Moreover, there was a genuine concern that were
the strike to continue expanding and becoming more pronounced, the participants would be
liable to turn against the Committee itself. And it was this concern, that of exponential
expansion, that was reciprocated by the rulers of the Arab countries who themselves were
witnessing similar outbursts, albeit on more atomised scales.
Thus, at the consultation of both the British administration and the Arab Higher
Committee, the authority of the Arab rulers, mainly in Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Iraq, was
brought to the fore in an attempt to quell the outbreak. On October of 1936, the Committee
released a statement that read as such:
“Inasmuch as submission to the will of their Majesties and Highnesses, the Arab
kings, and to comply with their wishes is one of our hereditary Arab traditions,
and inasmuch as the Arab Higher Committee firmly believes that their Majesties
and Highnesses would only give orders that are in conformity with the interests of
their sons and with the object of protecting their rights; the Arab Higher
Committee, in obedience to tire wishes of their Majesties and Highnesses, the
Kings and amirs, and from its belief ill the great benefit that will result from their
mediation and cooperation, calls on the noble Arab people to end the strike and
the disturbances, in obedience to these orders, whose only object is the interests
of the Arabs.”74
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This followed previous attempts by the then Amir Abdullah of Transjordan and Nuri Said of Iraq
to mediate with the Committee on behalf of the British administration. A month after the release
of that statement, the six month-long general strike came to an end again by invoking the Arab
rulers’ orders. King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and King Ghazi would then become even further
involved, pushing the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin Al-Husseini into congregating with
the British Royal Commission. The aforementioned Peel Commission of 1937 had proposed
partition of the land and had been met by complete rejection by the Arab Higher Committee.
Upon the involvement of the Arab states, fragmentation began to seep into the Committee and it
was eventually disbanded and declared illegal by the British Administration.
Despite the discontinuation of the partition proposal, Britain still sought to reach a
compromise with the Palestinian leadership, who were always more than eager to engage with it
even against the will of the general population. Again, these discussions were facilitated by the
Arab regimes. Led by the Iraqi and Saudi delegations but also joined by the Yemenis and the
Egyptians, these parties in cooperation with the second iteration of the Higher Arab Council (this
time spearheaded by a new representative of the Husseini family, Jamal Al-Husseini, though still
being orchestrated by the now exiled Grand Mufti) convened at the Round Table Conference in
London. While this was taking place, the general revolt in Palestine remained ongoing. In fact,
similar iterations began spilling over into Transjordan which shifted the role of the
Transjordanian regime from diplomatically trying to undermine the Palestinian revolt into
physically and militarily combatting it. In active participation with British forces and Zionist
militias, the Transjordanian regime arrested key figures in the revolt, shut down regional routes
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which had allowed the Palestinians to avoid capture and aided unofficial paramilitary groups to
engage in quelling the rebellion’s expansion.75
It should be noted that there were more than 5,000 Arabs killed and almost 15,000
wounded during the entirety of the four-year period that concluded in 1939, making it second
only to the Algerian revolt in the amount of victims lost in a single anti-imperialist revolt in the
Arab world.76 The unit most often utilised to make sense of anti-imperial violence is that of the
nation. The dominant analysis contends that the arbitrary colonial divisions led to a disruption of
the social regional fabric which thus erupted into outbreaks of resistance.77 But the Sykes-Picot
agreement was not only an attempt at state-building, it was simultaneously an attempt at
appropriation of land for private gain. Resistance against British mandatory administration and
Zionist seizure of land should be understood through the lens of the expansion of European
capital and industrial property relations into distinct, localised areas that had previously not
really known such boundaries. In fact, it was partially Jewish capital’s ability to outgrow Arab
capital within mandatory Palestine that tipped the power relation so heavily in their favour. For
example, investment as a percentage of gross national product in the Jewish community between
1922 and 1939 reached 39.3 percent (generally considered very high) in comparison to 12.2
percent in the Arab community (generally considered quite low). Jacob Metzer provides a quite
concise explanation as to why this was the case, stating the causes as:
“(a) the more versatile options for capital buildup in the modern Jewish
rural and general economy, relative to the largely traditional Arab rural sector,
where the accumulation of wealth was largely confined to land; and (b) the more
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developed Jewish capital market and quasi-public credit facilities that served the
Jewish farm economy, whereas Arab agriculture depended, at least in part, on
personal providers of credit, making for concentration of land ownership
throughout the Mandate period.”78
More crucially to the accumulation of capital which was vital to the growth of the Jewish
national economy was the capital entering into mandatory Palestine through immigrants. At least
85% of the capital influx in Palestine between 1932 and 1946 came from an external supply.
This of course facilitated the increase of Jewish land holdings, who were funded by two capital
holding organisations; the Jewish National Fund (created by the World Zionist Organisation) and
the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (established by Baron Edmund de Rothschild).
This allowed for an ability to gradually dominate land ownership in Palestine as Arab feudal
landlords, incapable of seeing beyond their immediate economic interests, were all too willing to
sell their holdings, as they “both benefited from the dualism of the Palestinian economy and
willing reinforced its structure.”79 Large swathes of the peasantry and those who worked the land
under Arab ownership found themselves dispossessed and thus began the process of
proletarianisation of the Palestinian people, a theme that will be largely recurrent throughout this
analysis.
One figure who was more acutely cognisant of this situation was King Abdullah of
Transjordan (who was Emir at the time and would become king in 1946), who would have had to
become embroiled in the situation whether or not he so desired due to the proximity of the two
territories. But Abdullah was actually quite eager to become involved and he opportunistically
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tried to engage with the Zionist movement for self-serving reasons. Often attributed to his
political education under Ottoman tutelage, Abdullah did not harbour antipathy to the Jews of
Palestine, rather seeing that they “were potentially of immense value for their connections, their
drive and their talents, and their reputed wealth, and Abdullah believed it was worthwhile to try
and conciliate them with a generous ‘autonomy’”.80 But more importantly than this apparent
strain of tolerance was the similarity of his position to the Zionist project. He also possessed
substantial wealth and he also was arbitrarily grafted onto a land from which he did not originate,
with the support of the British, while possessing grand imperial ambitions. It was mutual class
interests and allegiances that saw the Transjordanian regime tacitly and overtly support the
colonising forces in Palestine to disrupt the rebellion that erupted in 1936. And this attitude
would continue all the way until his assassination in 1952. In that period was of course the 1948
War of Independence wherein supposedly the entire Arab world united to try to dismantle the
Israeli state in its infancy.

Partition and War
The Peel Commission’s proposals, which had been very much to Abdullah’s favour since he
perceived himself to have a substantial chance of taking over the 80 percent of Palestine which
would be granted to the Arabs, was disrupted by the Second World War. Proving himself to be a
valuable ally during the war, however, talks of partition would be reignited following its
conclusion. In fact, partition began to gain traction not just with the Transjordanian regime but in
Egypt in 1946 when a Zionist diplomatic delegation had convinced prime minister Ismail Sidqi
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to accept partition.81 The reasoning for this had been the hope that a ‘resolution’ to the problem
in Palestine would lead to the evacuation of the British from Egypt. Nevertheless, Sidqi’s
acceptance was conditional on the support of another Arab state in order to try to push the
proposal through with the recently formed Arab League. The Zionist delegation then proposed
the matter to Abdullah who tried to simultaneously appease the British desire to implement the
partition while retaining a plan for a larger Arab federation with a degree of Jewish autonomy.
Abdullah tried to get it both ways by receiving funds from the Zionist delegation while working
to eventually fulfill his imperial fantasies. Unaware of how little support his initiative was
getting at the London Conference of 1946 and 1947, which had been designed by the British
government to resolve the issue of Palestine conclusively, Abdullah soon found himself in an
even more isolated position once Ismail Sidqi was deposed in Egypt. Things took a drastic turn
when his hope of being handed Palestine through British support collapsed when the latter
announced its decision to conclude its mandate, following continued Jewish insistence on
partition, this time with the backing of the United States. Abdullah would vocally toe the Arab
League line of rejection of the proposal while trying to readjust his position whereby he could at
any point swoop in militarily. After a secret conference with the Arab League in March of 1947,
the Transjordanian delegate tried to support the consensus of potential action against the partition
while trying to distance himself from committing to their initiatives. As Avi Shlaim notes, ‘To
all those present in Cairo it was clear that the Transjordanian delegate’s references to the UN and
to Transjordan’s duties only served to mask his master’s determination to keep a free hand for
military intervention in Palestine in pursuit of his plans for territorial expansion.”82
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In fact, the most appropriate way to approach the 1948 War of Independence is arguably
as an intra-Arab war that happened to involve the Zionist faction. Simha Flapan puts this most
concisely when he states that:
“To be sure, the problem of Palestine, the attitude toward Zionism, and
the future of the Palestinian people were very important in the politics of the
region, but in retrospect, it is clear that they were not primary. The overriding
issue was the revival of the Hashemite plan for a United Arab Kingdom in
Greater Syria ruled by the Hashemites, supported by the British, and embracing
Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and at least the Arab part of Palestine.”83
Palestine represented access to the Mediterranean, which made it a vital asset to the
Transjordanian regime – eager to follow the Jewish economic model that had been established
over the past three decades. Iraq was open to the Hashemite proposal since the annexation of
Palestine would also give it access to the Mediterranean with the substantial commercial
opportunities that would come with it. The Saudi monarchy, which had previously come in
collision with the Hashemites when it expelled them from the Hejaz, had been concerned with
Abdullah’s expanding regional influence. The Palestinian nationalists, represented by the Grand
Mufti and the Husseinis, were equally averse to Abdullah’s scheming, and their fearful notions
of Abdullah impeding national sovereignty was echoed in Syria and Lebanon. And to complicate
matters further, Egypt favoured any initiative that would see the departure of the British from
their state, which had become increasingly fueled with domestic unrest.84 These dynamics were
all taking form within a global context too – that of the ravenous courting of newly discovered
oil in the Gulf by rivaling American and British capital.
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The secondary importance of the issue in Palestine to the Arab states was reflected in the
complete reluctance to mobilise any military forces in order to prevent partition. This would
remain the position up until very late, with the Egyptian minister of defence being quoted as
declaring three days before the war began that “We shall never even contemplate entering the
war officially. We are not mad.”85 This sentiment was echoed repeatedly by prime minister
Nuqrashi and foreign minister Khashaba who both made it clear that Egypt had no intention of
sending official military forces, though it could not prevent volunteers from joining the
fighting.86 This aversion can be explained by the transnational nature of capital expansion. The
ruling bloc of Egypt at this stage was a nascent bourgeoisie that was actively trying to expand its
influence in its own domestic borders and establish a national market as a province of
accumulation with linkages to the global political economy. Ismail Sidqi was in fact the
chairman of the Association of Industrialists and quite brazenly stated to the Zionist diplomatic
delegation that had convened with him in the mid 1940’s that he was “a businessman - not proJewish or pro-Arab - seeking the best for Egypt. If this demands Jewish-Arab cooperation, so be
it.”87 Much like Abdullah, the faction of capital owners in Egypt saw that a lot of benefit could
be attained from emulating their Zionist counterparts, with many of whom they had had
connections. Tal’at Harb had been proactive in establishing relations with the Jewish bourgeoisie
in Egypt in the early parts of the 20th century, coming to realise that they had access to resources
that were not available to Egyptians.88 Capital entering from European banks and investors such
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as the Deutsche Orient Bank circulated among elite Jewish families and as an ardent believer of a
cohesive nationalism, Harb was determined to work closely with these families. This Jewish
Bourgeoisie continued to become more prominent and by 1946 there were 38 joint stock
companies operating in Egypt that had an entirely Jewish Board of Directors (compared to 60
companies that had purely Egyptian Boards).89 Though many of the Jews within Egypt did not
consider themselves Zionists, there had been some fervent Zionist movements, particularly in
Alexandria where they were led by an important rabbi named Moise Ventura.90 A smooth
resolution to the Palestinian issue was seen as a priority for the likes of Sidqi and Nuqrashi, who
had consulted the Jewish Agency to “formulate proposals for the disengagement of Egypt from
the sterling bloc” and to shift towards an American alliance.91 Not only could Jewish
businessmen propel the industrial sector in Egypt by actively investing in the local Egyptian
economy but, more crucially, an established Zionist capitalism built on dispossession and racist
stratification was seen as providing an opportunity to connect Egypt’s economy with American
finance and institutions. Once again, class allegiances were a much more crucial determinant of
political action than national enmities. Nothing is more telling of the attitude of the Arab ruling
classes towards Palestine than when the Arab League finally decided to create a volunteer Arab
Liberation Army which became involved in what was largely developing into a civil war in
Palestine that would last until the conclusion of the British mandate in May 1948. Instead of
mobilising a clear and distinct strategy, “the ALA volunteers from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq who
infiltrated Palestine established their own courts and administrations in towns and villages and
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collected their own taxes - a measure that created severe tension between them and the local
population.”92 Even when the current obligated the Arab states to engage militarily, they still
tried to squeeze as much as possible from Palestine. This approach would certainly become more
refined as the conflicts matured.
But it would be amiss to underplay the agency of the Arab protagonist of what would
become a three-pronged occupation of historic Palestine and that was unquestionably Abdullah.
Abdullah had always been the Arab leader most invested in the fate of Palestine and that
stemmed from very distinct political and economic reasons. Abdullah’s kingdom, while
territorially defined, did not have a settled population and it most certainly did not have a
productive working class. The Transjordanian Bedouin population was significantly more
difficult to discipline into a class of property-less workers than the Palestinian Arab population
which had been exposed to advanced private property relations for almost three decades.
Transjordan was not bereft of workable land but it was certainly short of people. And this
arrangement was very fitting for the Zionist leadership, who were soon to be forcibly expelling a
local population and needed someone else to absorb them. In fact, the relationship between the
two only began to deteriorate after the war of 1948 exposed the reality of Abdullah’s kingdom,
realising that “his independence and sovereignty were fictitious. Transjordan was a country
without an economy and without a people. The 300,000 Bedouin living there did not represent a
cohesive society.”93
However, before coming to this realisation, Abdullah played a significant part in
determining the outcome of the war. Abdullah, despite being universally mistrusted by the other
members of the Arab League, was heavily pressured into participating and was assigned a
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commanding role at the onset of the war. The main reason for this was that Abdullah possessed
the only military with substantial experience, his Arab Legion which had partaken in the Second
World War on Britain's behalf. The Arab Legion did achieve notable victories during the war in
Gush Etzion, Jerusalem and Latrun, making it appear as if Abdullah had contributed in opposing
partition. But, at a closer look, the facts were different; as Abraham Sela duly points out, “all of
the battles with the Arab Legion were fought in areas outside the territory of the Jewish state, as
designated by the UN Partition Resolution, including those fought in Jerusalem.”94 General John
Glubb, who led the Arab Legion had made it perfectly clear to the British foreign secretary, at
the command of Abdullah, that “[t]he Trans-Jordan Government had never intended to involve
itself in any serious military operations at all, and it was fully aware from the first that partition
was inevitable.”95 Abdullah, fundamentally, did honour his alliance with what had now become
the state of Israel. The Arab legion refrained from combatting Jewish troops outside Arab
partition zones, fought defensively when Arab villages in the West Bank were at stake, did not
deter Israeli construction of a new road to Jerusalem, abandoned Arab strongholds within Israeli
territory in Lydda and Ramleh, de facto colluded with the Israeli Defence Force against Egypt in
the Negev, captured Bethlehem and Hebron from the Egyptians and generally actively prevented
their forces along with Syrian forces to capture any Palestinian territory.96 Such was the
suspicion of Abdullah that Egypt refused to accept his support in liberating a besieged and
heavily malnourished and under-resourced battalion in Faluja.97
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One last factor that is important to examine in order to unveil the reality of the 1948 War
is the formation of truces between the different Arab factions and Israel. Egypt was the first to
establish contact with Israel in seeking a bilateral settlement in September of 1948. The Egyptian
military performance had been generally unimpressive and it became apparent to King Farouk,
who had unilaterally decided on the engagement of troops in Palestine much to the dismay of his
government which had a much more pragmatic approach towards the inevitable partition, that he
would have to try to conclude the war effort without incurring further humiliation. Again,
Egypt’s demands did not have anything to do with wiping out the Jewish presence in the region
or saving the hundreds of thousands Palestinians who had become refugees overnight. The key
aspect to any armistice agreement was to occupy the Palestinian area which bordered the
Mediterranean (now more commonly known as the Gaza Strip) and a part of the southern Negev
primarily to prevent Abdullah from expanding there.98 But, if Israel’s diplomatic attitude towards
Abdullah had been somewhat dismissive and largely deceitful, then their approach towards
Egypt bordered on disdain. Several months later an armistice was reached, forming the Gaza
Strip and placing it under military administration. It should be noted that this was a drastically
reduced iteration of the Strip that had been outlined in the UN’s Partition Plan and that the
majority of arable land had been confiscated by Israel and that, even then, Israel violated the
armistice agreement as they continued to expel Arab inhabitants.99
Another episode that, although not quite as significant, but really quite illuminating in the
examination of Arab approaches towards Palestine concerned Syria. Syria had undergone a
military coup during the war that saw Husni Zaim come to power. These events are noteworthy

98

Shlaim, Collusion Across the Jordan, 317.
Benny Morris, The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 243-47.
99

46

for three main reasons. First, the old regime which he had helped in overthrowing was seen in
Syria as being responsible for the loss of Palestine, a sentiment which was obviously inflamed by
those who had deposed them. Echoing his contemporaries as well as most Arab leaders since,
Zaim deployed a vociferous rhetoric, promising to never cease the struggle against Israel. Upon
coming to power, he became overtly eager to try to actually attain a bilateral peace settlement.
The second issue which made the situation of significance was Zaim’s proposal to entice Israel
to come to a peace agreement with his regime. Zaim quite incredibly suggested that Syria would
be willing to take in 300,000 Palestinian refugees. This was not a temporary measure by which
he intended to pacify the Palestinian people until a point in the future in which they could return
to their homes; rather, this was essentially a full-fledged peace proposal in which the Palestinians
would find themselves a settled population within Syria. The third issue, which is not really
within the scope of this analysis but should be pointed out, was the Israeli leadership’s (mostly
David Ben Gurion’s) explicit resistance to any peace agreement. It has been a recurrent theme of
the larger situation in the region that Israel has notoriously rejected any actual peace with most of
the actors involved. Though the official reasoning was that Zaim wanted unreasonable border
modifications, a temporary armistice that could re-erupt at any given moment seemed to suit a
state that would become increasingly expansionist and militant over time. Thus Zaim eventually
accepted the armistice on offer before being promptly overthrown.100
These events bring us to the final and most important truce, that of Abdullah and
Transjordan. Chronologically, their armistice agreement was not the last to be made but it
notably followed the one with Egypt. This, of course, allowed Israel to concentrate all efforts on
the Eastern front of their war. Not that Abdullah had had any intention to make use of the
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division of Israeli forces but Israel had still needed to maintain a level of relations by which
Abdullah would not be heavily antagonised. After the Egyptian front was settled, all civility with
Abdullah was abandoned and he finally began to realise just how tenuous his position had been.
Abdullah had, in the space of a few months, gone from being willing to make actual peace with
Israel in spite of the Arab League, authoritatively demanding the inclusion of certain villages and
towns into his kingdom, making claims to areas occupied by the Iraqi army and trying to dictate
Israel’s relations with Egypt to meekly accepting an armistice in the sake of preserving the gains
he had achieved during the war, ceding claim to thirty villages in the Wadi Ara.101 Abdullah’s
hopes of conquering the Arab part of Palestine and being seen as a saviour evaporated as his own
administration started turning on him. Even more drastic for Abdullah was the huge demographic
shift that had taken place in his domain. Palestinians now outnumbered Jordanian Bedouins 3 to
1. More crucially was the material position of these Palestinians, who had been violently
dispossessed of their lands; however, what was even more problematic for the Transjordanian
regime was their resistance to incorporation into Abdullah’s kingdom. The Palestinian
population widely viewed Abdullah as having betrayed their cause, facilitating their expulsion
overtly in Lydda and Ramleh, trading off their villages in the Wadi Ara and actively opposing
any attempts at national self-determination. By May 1951 the Transjordanian government
extended national legislation into the West Bank in order to apply its policies on restructuring of
land ownership and extend its taxation jurisdiction.102 Two months later Abdullah was
assassinated by the Palestinian nationalist faction.
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Egyptian and Jordanian Administration of the Palestinian Territories
This final section of the general history of the Arab role within the larger Palestinian situation
seeks to examine how the Palestinian territories were administered when they were under direct
political control of these states. With Egypt and Jordan receiving de facto control over the Gaza
Strip and the West Bank respectively, a state-centric or a nation-centric lens would expect
convergence of interests and some absorption of the newly attained land and labour resources
into Egyptian and Jordanian societies. But the lack of substantial development that occurred
between 1948 and 1967 would leave such frameworks with but one conclusion to draw; that of
Arab ineptitude. A lens that deploys class analysis, however, provides a more convincing
explanation; that administration of the territories served someone and some purpose. There is of
course a substantial factor that cannot be discounted when trying to evaluate the administrations
of Gaza and the West Bank – namely, the role of Israeli militarism in inhibiting and retarding
development. Persistent Israeli aggression has made it difficult to evaluate these administrations
independently but, nevertheless, some general trends emerge in the governance of the Egyptian
and Jordanian states. More specifically, there are two notable themes that illuminate the larger
Arab approach towards Palestine. Primarily, the political economies of Gaza and the West Bank
were ones that fostered relations of dependency and cultivated a paternalistic image that has
always existed as an undercurrent throughout the entirety of the conflict. The second major
theme is the neutering of independent national, political movements in Palestine. Subservience to
the respective states was the most important aspect of any political organisation. The
continuation of the emergence of these themes in the contemporary moment requires a historical
examination of their origins.

49

With regards to the Gaza Strip, there are two essential points that ought to be taken into
consideration prior to evaluating Egyptian administration. The first point is Egypt’s approach to
the refugee situation in the Strip. Unlike Jordan, Egypt did not intend to permanently absorb the
Palestinian population and the extension of territorial boundaries into Gaza had been largely an
attempt to stifle Jordanian expansionist aims. Similarly, the Palestinian population of Gaza,
which was now largely comprised of refugees, had no intention on permanently relocating in
Gaza and was naturally hostile towards any steps of integration.103 The second crucial point is
just how arid and unfavourable in terms of economic capacities the Gaza Strip was. The Clapp
Commission, which was formed after the war of 1948 in order to resolve some of the
humanitarian crises that had erupted, attempted to find economic opportunities for the refugees
in the areas where they were concentrated in the Middle East. The only place where no
opportunities were found was Gaza – ironically, the place with the largest number of refugees.104
UNRWA was formed in response to these findings and was the largest contributor to
humanitarian relief during Gaza’s early years under Egyptian administration. It was extremely
vocal during that period about the inability of the Strip to sustain its current population, or in fact
its original population, stating that the area was “overpopulated and lacking any considerable
endowment in natural resources” and that it was “too small and to provide a satisfactory
livelihood for the original population.”105
The Egyptian government effectively accentuated the problems that the refugee
population was facing. Migration into Egypt proper was heavily restricted and thus even the
limited opportunities in the Strip were weakened. As a result of an influx of a labour surplus, that
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was not only vast but also quite educated, wages plummeted drastically in Gaza.106 The political
context of Egypt goes some way to clarify this negligence. The UN Palestine Commission
having surveyed the region found that Egypt was “a society composed of a peasant majority and
a minority of landowners living at the extremes of misery and opulence, with a few families
represented by pseudo-political parties, the king, the army, and an intransigent Muslim
hierarchy.”107 As a consequence of this heavily unequal society, there had been significant
fomentation of domestic turbulence within Egyptian society with worker and peasant militancy
and student activism were starting to brew. An additional discontented group being introduced
into Egyptian society would have been disastrous for King Farouk and the ruling class of Egypt.
In fact, one of the ways in which the legitimacy of this faction was propped up was through the
depiction of the Palestinian refugees as a looming threat that put the Egyptian population at risk.
Al-Ahram, effectively the state newspaper, described the refugees as “living in a society with no
religion, no morals, and no community life.”108 As it were, the death knell rang regardless as the
Free Officers instigated their coup in 1952 and overthrew the monarchy. This, however, does not
imply that the migration policy changed much between the two regimes. The language of
demonization persisted with a 1953 report from The Department of Refugee Supervision,
Government Assistance, and Social Affairs describing Egyptian policy in Gaza as an attempt “to
stop the decline into depravity or the rot of Satan or the fall into destruction which has already
afflicted some of them…”109 Such was the resultant desolation of the Palestinian refugees that
many of them (an estimated 5,000 to 10,000) attempted to enter Israel in what the Israeli state
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marked as ‘infiltrations for economic reasons.’. This was in spite of approximately 500
Palestinians being shot on sight annually throughout the early 1950’s.110
In fact it was only between 1955 and 1957 when Egyptian president Gamal Abdel-Nasser
began to realise the strategic benefits of championing the Palestinian cause. In 1955 Israeli
troops entered Gaza and attacked an Egyptian military base. The event, which would then
escalate into the Suez war, would force the new Egyptian military regime to consider actual
solutions to the problems in Gaza (though not to much effect). Until that moment, Egypt had
reacted to Israeli incursions in Gaza against Palestinian nationalists by increasing repression of
the Gazan population as a whole. Nasserist paternalism was reflected from Egyptian society onto
Gazan society as all political parties were banned inside the Strip, in spite of the increased
provision of social services. Political activities were allowed in Gaza only following the Israeli
occupation of Gaza that had occurred in 1956 and ended in 1957 and, even then, subservience to
the Egyptian state was a prerequisite. Gaza was granted a legislative council, which for five
years after its formation in 1957 was chaired by an Egyptian official. By 1962, the chairmanship
had been passed to a local Palestinian but half the representatives were still appointed by the
Egyptian state.111 Along with the formation of the Arab National Union in Gaza, the Egyptian
administration had created two political outlets for the Palestinians, though both clearly created
with the intention to supplement Nasser’s own political project.112 Any alternative methods of
political organisation during the time were largely thwarted, particularly as those affiliated with
the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communist Party were arrested.113 The flipside of this social
contract was the introduction of basic social needs within Gaza but even then they were heavily
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regulated so as to prevent any sort of political opposition. An instructive case is the provision of
free education within Gaza and the increased allocation of resources towards schooling. These
schools, however, were avenues of mass surveillance with Administrative reports showing plenty
of instances in which principals were informed to ensure that their teachers were not promoting
political activities.114 With incidents of suspicion, the Egyptian Administration frequently
responded by sending police officers to investigate and even imprisoning some of the figures
deemed responsible.115
The formation of trade unions and a Women’s Union was approved in 1964. Much like
inside Egypt, however, the heads of these unions were selected by the state and quite clearly
aligned with it, and restrictive measures were constantly being employed. 116 The most notable
aspect of the political administration of Gaza by Egypt was the creation of the Palestinian
Liberation Organisation in 1964. The PLO will be discussed in greater depth throughout this
analysis but for now it should be made abundantly clear that it was fundamentally an Arab
League sponsored organisation and one that “was not meant as a political vehicle for Palestinian
Liberation, but as an instrument of Arab state control over disaffected Palestinian masses.”117
The economic landscape reveals even more about the Egyptian management of the Gazan
situation. As previously stated, the key theme of the political economy of Gaza was dependency.
In 1954, money spent on imports in Egyptian pounds totalled at 1,345,000 whereas exports were
at 424,000, making the balance of payments a deficit of 921,000. By 1966, this deficit had
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increased to 12.6 million.118 Of course inflation can skew the figures quite drastically, so a better
way to compare the two periods is by calculating exports as a percentage of imports. In 1954,
this figure is approximately 32% whereas in 1966 the figure is 26%. This regression is even
more difficult to fathom when taking into account that in 1954, the refugee crisis was effectively
at its worst. Another quite indicative trend is the increase in UNRWA transfers in the twelveyear period, rising from 2.3 million to 3.7 million, in comparison to the money spent on Egyptian
administration, which instead increased from 200,000 to 3.7 million. Once again, it is important
to discount some of these increases due to inflation, as in late 1965 the rate of inflation in Egypt
actually reached a peak during the Nasser period of around 17.4%.119 For UNRWA spending
there was a 61% increase whereas Egyptian expenditure rose by 175%. Part of that massive
increase in Egyptian expenditure certainly was correlated to Nasser’s shifting priorities and his
increased interest in Gazan development. But viewed in conjunction with the regressing balance
of payments, it becomes apparent that a political economy of dependence was becoming
entrenched through Egyptian governance. This is further evidenced by the promotion of
economic activity that does not seek to rectify the problems in Gaza but simply work with them.
The illegal smuggling trade was indirectly promoted by the Egyptian state and migration into the
Gulf was heavily encouraged. The service sector was expanded and new markets were opened to
Gaza, but manufacturing and productive sectors were largely neglected.120 The few industrial
commodities produced in the Strip were either consumed by Gazans or by Egyptians. Gaza was
actually designated a free trade area and hence could not provide measures of protectionism to
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stimulate its already negligible industrial sector. Agriculture dominated the Gazan economy and
citrus production became by and large the only profitable crop in Gaza with its economy
revolving substantially around it, making it in effect a monocrop economy. To make matters
worse, citrus production is severely water intensive – a resource already lacking in Gaza. Such
was the excessive nature of water consumption in the Strip that it was effectively equal to
consumption in the West Bank, despite the quantity of agrarian land there far exceeding the
quantity in Gaza.121 All this contributed to a period of very scant development that was also
extremely unbalanced. There is an argument to be made that Egypt was simply reacting to
unforeseen circumstances but the reality was that the Nasser regime was responsible for the
dissolution of the All-Palestine government that had existed previously and Palestinian self-rule
was ruled out upon the formation of United Arab Republic. Even with the creation of the PLO, it
was announced that political authority would be transferred to them but a formal transfer never
took place. To put it simply, Gazan independence was not on the Egyptian agenda, in spite of the
authority that being proponents of the cause provided.
The annexation of the West Bank by Jordan was different from Egyptian governance in
Gaza in terms of the details though it largely engendered the same political and social relations
that inhibited the Palestinian national movement. The key difference was the integration of the
Palestinian refugees into the Jordanian economy. An important point should be noted in that the
West Bank was not integrated into Jordan, but the refugees were integrated into the economy.
Again, this analysis exists within the context of Israeli militarism and that had quite substantially
deprived the West Bank of most of its fecund land. But, even then, the West Bank was still
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substantially more advanced economically upon annexation.122 The dominant scholarly view of
this predicament implies that the East Bank was favoured in terms of state investment and thus
migration from west to east (as well as to the Gulf, a process which will be discussed in a lot
more detail in the upcoming chapters) increased. In other words, the Palestinian refugees of the
West Bank underwent a process of proletarianisation. Don Peretz describes state policy as
follows:
The Jordanian government explicitly favored the East Bank in industrial and
infrastructural (electricity, transport) development. This was located in the
Nablus; other major projects including an oil refinery, potash plant and cement
factory were placed on the East Bank. Businessmen were compelled to open new
factories on the East Bank and sometimes to even transfer businesses there. The
only major water development projects, the Yarmuk River dam and the east Ghor
Canal, were located in the East.”123
The West Bank was made largely inhospitable as unemployment continued to rise and per capita
income remained relatively low in relation to its Eastern counterpart. This was a method of
disciplining the now Palestinian majority of the Jordanian population who were seen as “a bitter,
impoverished, seething body politic, awaiting vengeance for the loss of their homes and land.”124
The Jordanian state deployed a carrot and stick approach with regards to the integration
and whereas the stick existed in the economic realm, the carrot was very much present in the
political realm. Citizenship was granted to all of the Palestinian population, even if their
passports were marked to distinguish them as Palestinians. There was even some integration of
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Palestinians into the state apparatuses, but these positions were usually gifted as a reward to the
Palestinians who had supported the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan. Palestinian elites
were actively co-opted by the Jordanian state as they were granted provincial and governmental
offices.125 But even with these attempts at integration, Palestinians were still denied positions in
“the most sensitive posts in the army, police, security apparatus, and in the royal palace.”126 In
fact, Jordan was highly cautious regarding any initiatives of arming the Palestinians, who
become more militant and mobilised, specifically in response to Jordanian apathy towards Israeli
militaristic incursions, which were constant until the West Bank was entirely occupied in 1967.
A tumultuous political dynamic began forming as a result of the integration of the
Palestinians in the political landscape of Jordan. These came to fruition in 1956 when the
National Socialists won parliamentary elections, while several other radical groups made gains
(the communist National Front, the Ba’athists and the Muslim Brotherhood). Among the first
actions taken by the new parliament was disposing of one of the last vestiges of British colonial
rule, general John Glubb who had commanded the Arab Legion during 1948. King Hussein’s
response to this new dawn was to dismantle it before it grew by dismissing Suleiman Nabulsi,
arresting around 500 politicians and outlawing all political parties altogether.127 Most of the most
influential figures in the party landscape had been from the West Bank and it was the source of
the radicalisation of Jordanian politics in that period.128 The response was an increase in violence
internally in Jordan and externally towards Israel, the culmination of which was the eruptions of
1967 and 1970.
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Conclusion
This chapter seeks to illustrate the genesis of the regional relations that have perpetuated this
conflict to the present day. Through the three moments depicted, patterns that continue to persist
start to emerge. Primarily, the contrast between public declarations and covert actions stands out
through the 1930’s and 1940’s. The prioritisation of domestic class interests, in correspondence
with imperial elites, was the defining factor in determining how the Arab Revolt and the 1948
war unfolded. Cooperation with Zionist leaders for pragmatic purposes at the detriment of the
Palestinian Arabs was quite prevalent with King Abdullah being the chief orchestrator of this
movement, though incidents in Syria and Egypt largely mirror this phenomenon. Following
1948, the administrations of Gaza and the West Bank set the stage for the relations of
dependency and exploitation that have coloured the Palestinian experience since then. Denial of
political agency and prevention of balanced and sustainable development were at the centre of
the Egyptian and Jordanian approaches in the two decades that followed occupation, ensuring
that an empowered Palestinian national movement never emerged but keeping it alive for selfserving ends, either as a potential threat or as a source of legitimacy and authority.
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Chapter 3 - Exploitation of the Diaspora
Analyses of the Palestinian diaspora has frequently been deprived of a thorough political
economy perspective. Too often it has been consigned to either one or the other, without much
overlap. From a political standpoint, the spread of Palestinians across the Middle East is often
portrayed as resulting from an indefinite condition of statelessness. It is in this domain that the
notions of national, ethnic and religious commonalities are invoked in order to make sense of the
absorption of Palestinian migrants within the Arab world. Economically, the issue is simply a
result of a mutually beneficial transaction. The Palestinians, though plentiful and in possession of
considerable human capital, simply do not have access to either land or capital. Conversely, the
neighbouring Arab states, though either extremely rich in terms of capital (the Gulf) or in terms
of workable land (Jordan), have a serious shortage of labour. Hence a natural agreement is
reached that stands to benefit all parties involved. In true liberal fashion, both perspectives avoid
the historical formation of these conditions, while also neglecting the intricacies within the
sphere of production wherein profit is realised. The Palestinian diaspora has been a hugely
exploitable group within several Arab societies who have benefited from their inability to return
to their homes as a result of the Israeli occupation.
This chapter seeks to examine only one group within the diaspora; the population of
migrants who would be legitimately employed within the formal political economy of the
respective states in which they ended up. There’s a substantial distinction between this group and
the majority of Palestinian refugees which reside in camps. The dynamics of exploitation operate
very differently between these two groups and this will be expanded upon in a later chapter.
Furthermore, there is another distinction to be made between the Palestinians who were absorbed
as part of the working class of these societies and the Palestinian elites who were integrated into
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the hegemonic class in a way largely antithetical to the establishment of Palestinian autonomy.
Again, this will be examined in another chapter.
The exploitation of migrant Palestinian workers in the Arab world has been a historically
a fruitful avenue of accumulation for three reasons. Primarily, the stateless nature of Palestine
migrants has perfectly suited the transitory model of labour migration that exists in several areas
of the region. Secondly, as a highly educated population that already possessed a substantial
degree of exposure to the relations of production of commodity society, Palestinian migrants
have traditionally been utilised as a disciplining force against the local populations of these
burgeoning states. Thirdly, through the manipulation of the mobility of the diaspora (either
inward or outward), further tethers of dependency become entrenched between a prospective
Palestinian national entity and its Arab donors.

The Case of the Gulf
Up until the 1990’s when the second Gulf War was used as a pretext to expel the majority of the
Palestinian diaspora, the Gulf states had traditionally been some of the largest absorbers of the
dispossessed Palestinians.
In order to develop a more cogent understanding of this process, it is necessary to
conceptualise the political economic structure of the Gulf states. There are fundamentally three
classes that comprise this structure. The ruling families within the Gulf possess effective control
over all land and resources and they serve a twofold function. Primarily, they grant internal
access to these resources and derive rent through these relations. This is the basis of the oft used
label ‘rentier state’ that is designated to the political economic structure of the Gulf. The second
function of this class exists as a result of “a distinct intertwining of state and the ruling families
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in a relation of indistinguishable organic unity”, and in this sense the state is the guarantor of the
external realisation of the accumulative process.129 The majority of consumption is realised in the
act of export of the region’s primary resource: oil. The state thus operates as “an intermediary
between the world capitalist order and the local economy and society.”130 The second class in
this vertical hierarchy comes from the local population, who through acts of patronage by the
ruling family, derive access to property and serve as an administrative class to the extraction of
the resources that then enter the global market. The third sector of this structure, and the one with
which this analysis is most concerned, is the working class. The working class has not always
been totally dominated by migrants, though there has been a quite evident trend of a preference
towards employing foreign labour power. Examining the history of this trend in concomitance
with the dispersal of the Palestinian population sheds light on the political nature of migration in
the Gulf.

Following the Nakba
Migration of Palestinians to work in the Gulf has taken place since the very beginning in 1948
and has happened in waves since. The first wave which immediately followed the Nakba largely
concerned those who had the economic capabilities and the network of relationships to allow
them to take residence in the Gulf. Even within a refugee population, there were still economic
stratifications that govern the opportunities available. Aramco, initially a joint venture between
Standard Oil of California and King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, was one of the first entities in the
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Gulf to see the benefit of employing Palestinian labour. The recruitment of Indian workers
throughout the decade or so leading up to the Nakba had proved tumultuous and by March 1943
had culminated in the first ever organised labour strike in the history of Saudi Arabia.131 The
next couple of years saw the Saudi government try to limit the number of Indian workers, that
indeed decreased from representing 15.8% of Aramco’s foreign labour force in 1945 to 12.2% in
1948.132 It is important to note that the recruitment of Arabs was never a priority for Aramco
during that period and both Egyptians and Iraqis were “decried by the Saudis who feared an
influx of nationalist agitators.”133 Instead the influx used to discipline the Indian workers were
Italian internees from Eritrea, who were initially supplied with low wages and granted appalling
living conditions.134 Only when strikes started taking place (1945 and 1947) did Aramco start
opening regional offices for recruitment. Aden and Khartoum were the main centres and by
1949, 898 and 428 workers were employed respectively.135 At that stage there had been fewer
than 100 employees from Palestine. In May of 1949, the King personally made it clear to
Aramco that they should employ workers of Palestinian origin. He had even specified that he
wanted at least 1,000 Palestinians to working at Aramco, a figure that exceeded the number of
migrants of any other nationality (excluding American). By October, over 5,650 Palestinians had
applied at a newly opened recruitment office in Beirut and by 1951 there were 940 contracted
employees at Aramco, surpassing the amount of Yemeni and Sudanese workers (679 and 616
respectively). The Saudi government, under the instruction of the king, had let it be known that
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Palestinian labour should be integrated into the burgeoning oil sector and two more major Gulf
oil companies, the Kuwait Oil Company and the American Oil Company, positively indicated to
recruiters that they had a desire to hire Palestinian workers, while PDQ eventually followed their
lead in the 1950’s.136137
This was very much in line with King Abdul-Aziz’s policy regarding the Palestine issue
during the immediate post-World War II period. Saudi policy had, like all other Arab states, been
influenced to some degree by the desire to retain a public image of being supportive to the
Palestinians. However, two other factors were far more influential. The first was the budding
relationship with the United States who were at the very least perceived to be in support of the
Zionist project. Abdulaziz in fact admitted in a private correspondence with the regional director
of Trans World Airlines (who would later relay the message to the State Department) that his
intentions were “never to let Palestine interfere with his relations with the United States” and that
he was “talking big because everyone else is. It seems to be the most effective course.”138
Finding an immediate resolution to the refugee crisis that did not involve overt aggression
towards Israel was highly beneficial to Saudi interests. The second factor was the rivalry
between Abdul-Aziz and the Hashemites. Significant involvement in the 1948 War had always
been seen by Saudi Arabia as potentially being beneficial to Abdullah’s Greater Syria Project
and thus minimal support was provided. There was a concerted effort by Abdul-Aziz to prevent
Abdullah from consolidating the territory of the West Bank, having told him directly that he did
not approve of such a plan in May of 1948.139 The fight for Palestinian labour was an extension
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of this struggle and Saudi Arabia moved swiftly as the war came to its conclusion in trying to
bring over refugees.
Even more revelatory in how the Gulf approached the issue with Palestine were the trade
relations established with the newly formed Israel. As early as 1951 there are indications of oil
being shipped from Qatar to Israel. Initially small shipments of crude oil sent from Qatar to
Haifa to be refined were discovered, with the empty tankers proceeding from there to Tripoli,
Lebanon to continue shipping oil from the Iraqi Petroleum Company to other destinations.
Kuwait then proceeded to join Qatar in shipping oil to Israel at a much higher rate. By the
following year 268,000 tons were shipped to Israel and that figure more than doubled in 1953
with 600,000 tons being shipped.140 This of course very much went against the public
proclamations made the Gulf states in the aftermath of 1948 who had declared, led by AbdulAziz, that they would not engage in any economic relations with Israel. More problematically
was the fact that a British political agent situated in Kuwait believed that the Kuwaiti Emir
Abdullah Al-Salim was aware of the shipments and had adopted a policy of turning a blind
eye.141 Though eventually putting a stop to these shipments under concerns of being discovered
and confronted by members of the Arab League, the landscape for the upcoming decade had
already been set.
The substantial influx of migration in the immediate aftermath of 1948 largely consisted
of people who had the economic means to travel from the Levant to the Gulf. The range of
occupations which comprised this first wave were directly associated with the apparatuses of the
state. As previously discussed with regards to Jordanian ambitions, there was a high demand for
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Palestinians who had been exposed to the transformative natures of state formation and capital
accumulation. With the global wave of decolonisation in full swing, partial sovereignty was
increasingly being realised in the Gulf and the consolidation of authority became an
imperative.142 Hence it was largely intuitive to import bureaucrats, accountants, police and army
officers, and teachers who were familiarised with the processes of constructing the ideological
and repressive apparatuses of the state.143 This took place predominantly in Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia. The latter also served as a lucrative venture for another faction of the Palestinian
diaspora; merchants and capital owners. The lack of regulations were enticing to those who now
sought new avenues for commerce and trade.144

Increased Migration in the Following Decades
The more prominent wave of migration to the Gulf took place in the 1950’s and 1960’s. The
Palestinian peasantry – arguably the group which was hurt most by dispossession – attempted
extremely difficult treks across the Arabian peninsula for the chance of employment in the Gulf.
Shafeeq Ghabra summarises this plight, describing that:
“Those among the peasantry who came to Kuwait were forced to travel
via the dangerous "underground railroad," which operated between the West
Bank and Kuwait. During the 1950s, thousands of young male peasants, many as
young as fifteen, came to Iraq this way. Then from Basra, they literally walked
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across the desert to Kuwait. Hundreds of others came to Kuwait in boats used by
smugglers in the Fao area (Iraq). On the way, many of those who crossed the
desert died of exposure and many of those who used the sea routes drowned.”145
The peasantry, which had become ripped from its traditional means of subsistence, was forced to
find new opportunities across the region. Moreover, the recreation of the relations that had
sustained them prior to 1948 was not possible due to restrictions on land ownership in the
majority of the countries to which they fled. Again, the theme of the Palestinians as a
proletarianised people and as a force for proletarianisation was in effect during this period. With
the prospects of finding employment as slim as they were, the Palestinian peasantry was
obligated to seek whatever work could be found across the region “primarily as seasonal laborers
in agriculture, in the building trades, or in the few industries which existed around the urban
centers.”146 In Aramco, the number of Palestinian employees had grown exponentially since the
initial recruitment, with almost 3,000 employees operating in their ranks. The construction
sectors of the Gulf were another avenue for Palestinian employment as workers were brought in
to build port, rail and residential facilities, while those who had previous experience working on
oil refineries and railways in Palestine were imported in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar for
similar work.147 Individualised service positions, such as seamstresses, tutors and house maids,
were also increasingly becoming occupied by Palestinians.
The other group who became entrenched within the Gulf were members of the
Palestinian bourgeoisie who found opportunities for penetrating the massive expansion of the
energy economy. They were readily welcomed by these states (and Britain, who was still largely
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in control due to the protectorate status of the majority of the Gulf countries) where “their
knowledge of English and of international trading made them especially useful.”148 The presence
of such figures in the Gulf was of course predicated by an inability to make inroads into the
heavily enclosed Palestinian economy. For the Gulf, there was a substantial benefit of having
entrepreneurial figures who were not locals as it deterred the prospect of a nascent local capitalist
class that could content political power with the existing monarchies. Moreover, and this can be
seen in the following chapter with figures such as Rafik Hariri, non-local Arab capitalists with
ties to the Gulf’s political class would eventually provide a valve through which Gulf capital
could dominate the economies of their neighbours.149 In the case of the Palestinian members of
this group, they continued to become more active in the Gulf with almost 200,000 members of
the Palestinian entrepreneurial class being present there by 1970.150
This initial influx of Palestinian labourers in the Gulf, however, was brought to a halt in
the mid-1950’s. Having become ingrained in a working class that was becoming more clearly
established, Palestinian workers in the industrial sectors of the Gulf political economy developed
and articulated demands. Strikes began and protests began to take place across the Gulf, with
iterations in Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Labour militancy began to become even
more bellicose due to two regional developments. Primarily, the Suez Crisis took place in 1956
and the issue was seen as part of the national struggle. Nasser, who had never hesitated to try and
curry favour with the Palestinians, was championed and demonstrations that amalgamated the
larger national struggle with the more personal work struggles began to take form.151 The other
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notable development was the election of the Suleiman Nabulsi-led parliament in Jordan. The new
coalition government, which had integrated numerous radical opposition voices, was pushing for
progressive labour rights legislation. Most notably was the attempt to legally recognise trade
unions. The ideas being proposed in Jordan naturally spilled over to the Palestinians abroad,
since not only did it instigate an awareness that things were changing for their people, but many
of them actually had family over in Jordan. These two reasons contributed to the substantial
organisation of labour activism in the Gulf.
In order to contain labour militancy, two primary initiatives were enacted. Firstly, many
Palestinians were simply and quite brazenly expelled as 160 workers were arrested and deported
by the end of 1954 with an additional 100 arrested in 1955 under the pretense of “unauthorized
political activity”.152 Additionally, many of those who remained were banned from working in
“sensitive sectors” – i.e. sectors that had a high potential for worker organisation and activism.153
These were mainly found in the industrial sector. The social nature of industrial work, especially
industrial work that was internally divided along national lines, enabled these labourers to
establish common grievances and then assert them in a political manner. Moreover, a lot of the
industrial work in the Gulf revolved around the quintessential commodity in its economies – oil
– and, as a result, any disturbances were highly detrimental. Thus these workers were expelled.
Naturally, their expulsion was made easier due to their lack of state citizenship. The workers
who were kept in the Gulf were either service sector workers or more skilled workers who were
ensured better pay in the Gulf than elsewhere, such as engineers, urban planners, doctors, and
educators.154
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The second measure was to try to control and regulate the migrants who were allowed to
enter. Kuwait was at the forefront of this initiative. In 1958 – the same year when the
suppression of Palestinians from working in certain sectors was enacted – Kuwait waived visa
requirements for Jordanians who wanted to migrate. This enabled Jordanian citizens, more than
half of whom were Palestinians, to enter Kuwait without prior work contracts.155 By codifying
such legislation, Kuwait was able to manage the official channels through which migrants
flowed, instead of incentivising journeys through the underground railroad. Moreover, it meant
that Jordanian state oversight was established for the migrant labourers and brought the issue
under the domain of bilateral relations.
Throughout the decade that followed, in Kuwait – in which the Palestinian/Jordanian
population comprised approximately a third of the expatriate population – more regulatory
measures were enforced. In 1959, the first citizenship law was enacted, restricting the number of
non-Kuwaiti residents in the country.156 As the number of Palestinians began to increase and
financially prosper, laws that prevented foreigners from competing with local holders of capital.
In 1965, two significant pieces of legislation were passed. The first decree required that any
industrial firms must be at least 51% owned by a Kuwaiti. The second went even further, stating
that only Kuwaitis were allowed to own banks and financial institutions. Likewise, in Saudi
Arabia, restrictions were placed on the social mobility of Palestinians. The Saudi government
pressured Aramco into prioritising local entrepreneurs and contractors, and Palestinians who
lacked “easy access to Aramco's capital subsidies and technical expertise as well as to
government permits, import licenses, and development funds, found competition difficult.”157
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Reconstituting Labour Relations
After the 1967 war, these regulations would be ramped up to an even more drastic degree with
the instatement of the sponsorship system. After the war and the occupation of Gaza and the
West Bank, migration began to take a different shape. Previously, the majority of those who
migrated to the Gulf were single men who only intended to access the Gulf as a source of
temporary income. Very few Palestinians had any intention of taking residence permanently in
these states and the Gulf states generally prevented them from doing so anyway. Remittances
were regularly sent back to the families of these workers. With the changing regional landscape
that was instigated in 1967, Palestinians began more proactive in trying to migrate as an entire
family unit. This was even allowed in Kuwait. Whereas in 1957 only a quarter of Palestinians
were women, by 1975 they were roughly half of the population.158 Though evidently there was a
clear relaxation of migration restrictions due to the increasing profits attainable from oil, it was
managed quite rigorously. The sponsorship system (kafala) that was introduced in 1968/69
meant that residency could only be obtained through employment from the direct sponsorship of
a Kuwaiti national.159 Once employment with the sponsor ended, residency was also terminated.
Moreover, the sponsor was responsible for all legal and financial matters of their foreign
employee.160 The familial nature of these migrations was also kept in mind with the
establishment of the sponsorship system. Children of migrants who reached adulthood “had to
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leave the country, even those who had been born and grown up in Kuwait, unless they obtained
their own individual sponsorship.”161
The sponsorship system is at its core an instrument of class domination. By delegating
power from the state or even to private entities to individual citizens, the struggles of the
working class become atomised to an extreme degree. There is no organisation to be realised
when the struggle is individualised in such a way. Additionally, the tether between residency and
employment is a highly effective tool in the disciplining of this class. This disciplining becomes
even more effective when the legal prioritisation of locals is always looming in the foreground.
This manifests itself in two ways – either by replacing migrants if a local becomes available in
the same position, or by coercing the migrants into accepting substantially lower wages by
invoking that threat of replacement.162 Since the sponsor is also delegated with the management
of the judicial and financial affairs of the employee, he is also able to restrict the employee from
looking for and moving to another employer.163 Beyond that, the sponsorship renewed the ability
for expulsion that was lost by granting Jordanian citizens the legal permission to migrate.
Whereas stateless Palestinians had been historically much easier to deport, citizens of a state
(Jordanian or other) had some protection. By codifying sponsorship, this became legally
achievable without much restriction.
The implementation of the sponsorship system was quite timely from a Kuwaiti sense as
it preceded two major events that contributed to the huge rise of migration to the Gulf during the
following decade. The first event was the civil war in Jordan that took place between 1970 and
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1971. Following confrontations internally between the recently emboldened Fedayeen
Palestinian forces operating within Jordan who were becoming more brazen, the Jordanian
regime had to diffuse the threat to its legitimacy. Even more problematic was the constantly
looming threat of Israeli militarism were the Jordanian regime to continue aiding the Palestinian
militants. Eventually this erupted into an extremely heavy-handed crackdown by the regime to
disperse the Palestinian resistance organisations from Jordan. During this civil war refugee
camps were attacked and destroyed leaving many Palestinians with no option but to flee.164
Many ended up in the Gulf. The second event was the huge oil boom that began in 1973. The
price of a barrel of standard Saudi crude oil skyrocketed from $2.59 in January of 1973 to $11.65
within a year.165 Additionally the ownership structure within the oil industry changed drastically,
with OPEC countries wrestling substantial control of oil revenues from the foreign companies
that had dominated the industry in the previous decades.166 This ushered in a massive influx of
migrant labour into the Gulf. Following the oil boom, migrant labour has constituted 50 to 70%
of the workforce in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain, and 80 to 90% in the other Gulf states.167
The demographics of Palestinians in the Gulf were hugely affected by the surge. In 1969,
the Gulf country which had the highest population of Palestinians had of course been Kuwait
with a population of about 140,000. Saudi Arabia hosted the second largest portion with 20,000.
The rest of the Gulf combined only had about 15,000.168 By 1981, every single Gulf state had
increased the number of Palestinians they were hosting, with more than a total of half a million
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residing there by that point. There were almost 300,000 Palestinians in Kuwait, 137,000 in Saudi
Arabia, 51,000 in Oman, 37,000 in the newly formed United Arab Emirates and 24,000 in
Qatar.169 Only in Bahrain was there a negligible amount of only 2,000. To put these numbers in
perspective, there were in 1981 roughly as many Palestinians in the Gulf as there were in Israel
and almost 100,000 more than in the Gaza Strip.
This increased dependence on the Gulf economies came at a time when the regional
policy of these states indicated an increased acceptance of Israeli presence. Primarily Israel and
Saudi Arabia found themselves operating on the same side for the first time with the war in the
Yemen that took place throughout the 60’s. Israel covertly provided the Saudi-sponsored Yemeni
Royalists with ammunition, equipment and food against Egypt and the mutual enemy of
Nasserism.170 In order for this to happen, Israel had to fly through air space and there are
indications to suggest that the head of Saudi intelligence, Kamal Adham, was aware that this was
taking place and turned a blind eye to it.171 Beyond the war in the Yemen, there were further
private indications of Saudi acceptance of Israel as King Faisal supported Resolution 242 (which
precluded recognition of Israel) behind closed doors as well as indications from Israeli
intelligence reports stating that King Faisal had made attempts to establish a dialogue with Israel
by the end of 1969 in order to reach some resolution.172 This was happening concomitantly as
Israel was allowing for the transportation of oil through territory it had acquired in 1967 in the
Golan. The Trans-Arabian Pipeline transported oil from Dhahran to the Zahrani River delta in
Lebanon, and part of the area that the pipeline crossed was now under Israeli occupation. Israel,
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however, forewent any royalty payments for these oil transfers and through American coordination, these flows persisted smoothly until 1975 when alternative, more efficient methods
were developed.173 Though there is the appearance of the halting of this co-operation with the oil
embargo that coincided with the 1973 October War, the reality is that immediately prior to the
war Kamal Adham had corresponded with the US ambassador in Cairo to let him know that the
elimination of Israel was not “a legitimate aspiration”.174 Furthermore, the embargo was lifted in
spite of none of his three demands that pertained to Palestine, total Israeli withdrawal from all
the Occupied Territories; international recognition of the Palestinian people’s right to selfdetermination; and the affirmation of the Arab character of Jerusalem, had been met.175
The 1970’s saw a rise in the calls for Palestinian statehood and sovereignty that the Gulf
states would eventually play an active role in hindering. The traditional approach used by these
states, led by Saudi Arabia, was to try to control the Palestinian national movement, not oppose
it. Radical Palestinian factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine had always been seen as a threat to the regional
hegemonic order, and by funding the PLO and Fatah, the more extreme iterations of Palestinian
nationalism could be curtailed and molded into a useful entity. In Kuwait, the “PLO office in
Kuwait worked closely with the government to prevent the infiltration of radical groups”.176 The
PLO was strengthened by a deduction of 5% of Palestinian salaries as a tax for the Palestinian
National Fund, organised and controlled by Fatah. This support was reciprocated by the PLO’s
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reduction of general political mobilisation by the diaspora as well as support for the Kuwaiti
regime in external affairs.177
By the late 70’s, however, the Palestinian population had become increasingly
radicalised. Communist party members had won several important posts in municipal elections
in the West Bank in 1976 and even aristocrats in Jordan who had been in favour of Hashemite
control of Palestinian land had “begun to declare openly their support for the PLO and for the
creation of a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.”178 The Gulf states pursued a
two-part solution to this. The first part was to eliminate the manifestations of this movement
locally. The Kuwaiti Education Ministry decided to close the separate PLO schools in 1976 in
order to crackdown on this fomenting political consciousness.179 The other approach was to try
and further consolidate PLO control of the movement. In 1978, at an Arab League summit in
Baghdad, an annual sum of $250 million was allocated to the PLO as a means to maintain their
confrontation of Israel.180 About a third of the aid, which also consisted of $1 billion to Jordan
and $2 billion to Syria, was provided by Saudi Arabia.

The End of Palestinian Migration in the Gulf
The 80’s were the date of expiration for the value of Palestinian labour power in the Gulf. The
meteoric rise of oil prices of the previous decade had subsided and a recession had crept forth.
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Palestinians bore a large brunt of that cost. Palestinian firms that operated in the Gulf were often
the last to be paid as government contacts were becoming frequently cancelled or delayed.181
Restrictions on Arab migration into the Gulf was heightened once more, as the backdrop of the
Lebanese civil war and Israeli invasion of Lebanon constantly creating more displaced refugees.
These patterns were pervasive across the Gulf as “pressure in Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Saudi Arabia to reduce the amount of work given to nonnationals grew as a result,
and by mid-1985, many Palestinians were being barred from entry.”182 The other crucial
development in the global political economy that had rendered the Palestinian working class in
the Gulf relatively disempowered was the emergence of the South Asian labour market as a
source of migrant labour in the Gulf. This served two distinct purposes. The first was economic.
Simply put, South Asian workers were cheaper to employ. Moreover, they were accustomed to
moving without their families and did not largely intend for extended periods.183 In addition, the
inability to understand the language meant that organisation or institutional interaction were a lot
more difficult. The second purpose was political and it was in response to the increasing
radicalisation of the Arab population. The late 70’s up to the 80’s were filled with events in the
Middle East that galvanised several factions in the region. Primarily, related to the Palestinian
issue was the Egyptian peace agreement in 1978, the two Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 1978
and 1982. Outside of that was the spillover of the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq War of
1980. Particularly relevant to the Gulf were the bombings of the US and French embassies in
Kuwait by Shia groups in Lebanon and Iraq.184 Avoiding affiliates of such radical groups
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become integral to the Gulf states and by 1985 there had been a reduction of Arab migrants from
72% of the total migrant population ten years prior to 56%.185
The final nail in the coffin for Palestinian life in the Gulf came with the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990. The Palestinian population in Kuwait had never been unified in support for the
Iraqi occupation, though in some circles Saddam Hussein, who had actively tried to take the
mantle previously held by Nasser as the leader of the Arab world and the primary supporter of
the Palestinian cause, was considered an important ally. The PLO had abstained in the Arab
League vote and had advocated a regional solution as opposed to heavy American military
involvement.186 Inside the Palestinian community in Kuwait, only small minorities were overt in
their support for Iraq. Most were quite cognisant about the tentative nature of their residence in
Kuwait and avoided taking distinct political positions with regards to the situation. Despite that,
there was some Palestinian involvement in the Kuwaiti resistance with the PLO and Fateh offices
in Kuwait even organising a demonstration in support of the Kuwaiti Emir in August of 1990.187
The resentment that was brewing in Kuwait towards the Palestinians largely emanated from the
fact that they did not cease to engage in economic activity during the occupation. Many
Palestinians continued performing their jobs or performing commerce and trade. The obligation
for Palestinians to keep working came from the simple fact that they could not afford to stop.
Palestinians in Kuwait had always received lower salaries than locals and were not eligible for
government stipends, social allowances and pensions.188 Hence the Kuwaiti calls for boycotting
work were frequently untenable and the Palestinian teachers, in particular, continued to perform
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their jobs. Despite that, modern estimates suggest that a 70% majority of Palestinians did
participate in the boycott, though the 30% minority was highly visible.189 Following the end of
the occupation, upon numerous acts often directed at random towards Palestinians, almost
350,000 Palestinians out of the 400,000 that had previously lived there were exiled from
Kuwait.190

Conclusion
Palestinian migration to the Gulf was not the coming together of market forces but rather a
political project. Primarily, the dispossessed Palestinians provided an opportunity for the Gulf
states to take advantage of a population with bureaucratic and labour insights, as well as an
exposure to foreign practices and techniques through which communication with the American
and British interests was possible. This active demand became apparent immediately through
King Abdul Aziz’s personal demands in the immediate aftermath of 1948. This served the
additional purpose of earning regional goodwill as being a supporter of the Palestinian cause.
This of course went against the contemporaneous economic relations with Israel that were
entrenching its position as a regional power. Moreover, as a stateless population without many
alternative options, the Palestinian population was much more containable than other
nationalities and the Gulf was more than content to deploy an ebb and flow of repression and
incentives as a method of regulating them. Mass deportations were enacted with Palestinians at a
much higher rate initially during the 1950’s and then again following the Gulf War. During that
period, mutual interests between the Gulf hegemon Saudi Arabia and Israel started cropping up
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and the lines between tacit and overt cooperation became increasingly blurred, once again
empowering Israel vis-a-vis its enemies in exchange for economic benefits. The Gulf’s
cultivation of political and economic dependency with regards to the Palestinians further allowed
for the neutering of a pronounced national movement as the PLO was propped up when needed
and discarded once surplus to requirements.
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion
With this analysis covering more than half a entire and traversing a number of states, it is
important to restate the intended objectives of the research and display how the cases form a
larger picture that addresses the primary question of the research: how have the Arab states
realised political and economic utility from the extension of this conflict and how has their
behaviour in the materialisation of these opportunities led to the extension of the conflict?
This investigation fundamentally stood on three different pillars. The first two pertain to
the opportunities that such a conflict provides for the actors involved, politically and
economically. The interplay between these two avenues is the foundation for this analysis, if it
could be discerned that the political economy of the conflict has been of benefit to these regional
actors then there is a solid basis for investigating their agency in creating the terms for their
profiteering. And this is the third pillar of the research: the cooperative measures deployed by
these actors with the agents of occupation and the ways in which these actions have made a
reversal of the occupation or a settlement of the conflict untenable.
In order to construct an analysis that appropriately addresses these three issues, it was
imperative that the particular historic moments were regarded both distinctly but also as part of a
larger whole. The power relations within the Middle East have quite overtly shifted since 1936
and thus different moments have involved different actors. In the midst of crumbling European
empire in the first half of the 21st century, new factions arose to facilitate the transfer of power
into the hands of the nascent national ruling classes. The underlying tensions that characterised
this scramble came to the fore twice, first in 1936 and again in 1948. Both underscore a
contradiction that remains endemic to the Middle East; that of the necessity to uphold an
appearance of national and religious unity against the naked class interests that are predicated on
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regional and domestic exploitation. Co-operation with the Zionist faction in the lead up to
partition is only unique insofar as it is in opposition to the belief embedded in the heart of Arab
nationalism that Zionism must be opposed. In actuality, it is merely an extension of the deference
to which Arab ruling elites have paid to the possessors of capital and arms, from which their
political authority can be litigated.
Examining the historic pre-conditions for the conflict is essential for uncovering the
reality behind what Palestine represents in the Arab national mythology. The Nakba, which
literally means catastrophe, has become conveyed over time as a sort of uncontrollable disaster
that afflicted the entire Arab world. The evidence quite pointedly refutes this myth by identifying
quite clearly the actors responsible in creating its preconditions and the ways in which they
attempted to manipulate it. Whether through the neutering of a militant national movement in
1936 by the Husaynis and the Nashashibis, in accordance with their patrons in Saudi Arabia, Iraq
and Transjordan, or through diplomatic negotiations with those who wished to dispel the
Palestinians in the lead up to 1948, there is substantial evidence to prove that there was no united
front intent on preventing the Nakba, but rather a coming together of forces that intended to
manipulate it for personal gain. With King Abdullah’s explicit co-operation and the Egyptian
ruling bloc’s tacit relations, it became quite apparent that the Palestinian national cause was not
only far from being a priority, but that inhibiting it could be highly beneficial for the state
formation and capital accumulation interests of these respective factions. As a result, a land grab
ensued, in which the confrontation between the soon to be established Israeli state and these
groups were either of trivial symbolic value, or due to encroachment on territory that these Arab
states had coveted for themselves. Thus the original sin that is so central to Arab mythology with
regards to Palestine was not an external event that they could not prevent, but rather a process
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that they were involved in engendering through indifference or covert scheming. Everything
since has been an exploitation of the conditions that they were complicit in creating.
Moments of crisis are simultaneously moments of opportunity and the dispossession of
the Palestinians provided numerous openings for regional actors. Hashemite administration of
the West Bank ensured that the Palestinian population could be transformed into a working class
as a force through which the Bedouin population could be disciplined and as a means to creating
a settled population in the new state of Jordan. Additionally, measures of uneven development
ensured that the East Bank would receive massive privileges in the form of infrastructure and
natural resource supplies that would force the migration of the Palestinians. Likewise, in the
Egyptian administration of Gaza, needed resources were withheld from Gaza and supplied when
it was politically expedient. The initial negligence of the Strip and the creation of an image of the
refugees as an impending security threat was eventually altered as Nasser utilised the Palestinian
issue as an appendage to his campaign for domestic and regional legitimacy, though the
Palestinians were never granted the same right as their Egyptian counterparts and any political
activity was endlessly regulated by an overbearing paternalistic Egyptian state. The result was a
diminished Palestinian resistance and in its place a controlled opposition that eventually sold
away all the demands and aspiration of those who they represented.
The creation of a stateless Palestinian diaspora was also a profitable avenue for the Gulf
states whose political economies are based on a distinct division of labour for citizens and
migrants. Personally requested by King Abdul Aziz, numerous oil companies would make use of
this existing labour force which effectively had no recourse and by which they could substitute
the alternative migrants who had become unruly and problematic. This is one of the particular
cases where agency can very much be established as not only is it on record that highly

82

influential figures demanded the existence of a Palestinian presence, but through trade relations
with Israel, it was ensured that the supply would continue to exist. And with this a trend was
developed for the Gulf states, who frequently found themselves on the same side as Israel in an
intense regional manifestation of the Cold War despite the continuing pretense of opposition.
With the informal intelligence cooperation in Yemen, the condoning of the Trans-Arabian
Pipeline by Israel and the lack of enforcement of the demands of the oil embargo, both sides of
this ‘conflict’ found themselves benefiting greatly through their mutual lack of hostility.
This corresponded with the waves and troughs of Palestinian migration in the Gulf which
was malleable in a way that few groups were. The initial wave following the Nakba was
followed by mass deportations in the late 50’s as the worry of the spill over of Palestinian
nationalism became more pronounced for these monarchies. With the reconfiguration of labourstate relations and the developments of methods of regulation through the institution of the
Kafala system, a new upsurge took place as the oil boom created a great demand for migrant
labour. But as globalisation dawned, it became apparent that exploitation of this notoriously
belligerent labour force was not feasible and through the huge expulsions that followed the Gulf
war, as well as the replacement of Arab labour with the drastically more fragmented South Asian
labour, the Palestinian presence was effectively eradicated in the Gulf.
With all this in mind, one can begin to understand a fundamental aspect of the Israeli
occupation. Though the dynamics and relations have changed through the decades, the constant
factor that transcends all the singular episodes is that the regional actors have positioned
themselves in a way where they can benefit from it without actually risking anything with
regards to their individual political economic interests. Again, this isn’t a revelation on its own
terms but it is vastly contradictory to the unique character of the Arab world. The implicit
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assumption of soildarity with the Palestinian cause is a central tenet of Arab nationalism, as can
be found in numerous public statements and diplomatic documents discussed throughout this
analysis, in a way that is hard to find in any other trans-state national identity. When the reality
so brazenly defies the ideal conception, other aspects of Arab national identity come into
question.
Furthermore, the understanding of this concealed dimension can illuminate several
contemporary phenomena. The discourse on “normalisation” has painted the shift as a rupture
from previous policy. Much is made of the Khartoum Resolution of 1967 and the three No’s
(peace, recognition, negotiation) and hence normalisation is conceptualised as something new.
But cooperation with Israel has existed from before it was even formally a state and has persisted
since. Normalisation is merely the collapse of a pretense that no longer needs to exist. The cycles
of capital and labour have always flown through Israel and the Arab states, collusion has always
covertly existed to ensure these flows. However, with the disempowerment of the Palestinian
national movement and the forceful counter-attack in the face of the uprisings of 2011, the need
to cloak these relations barely still holds. Especially with a pretext of a looming cold war with
Iran and its allies, recognition of Israel as a means of ensuring an alliance against a common
enemy has become exceedingly more palatable.
The cases outlined in this analysis are far from the only areas where the Arab states have
reinforced occupation. Israeli militarism has provided avenues for the accumulation of Gulf
capital through the process of reconstruction in several parts of the Middle East, most notably so
in Gaza and the West Bank themselves, and arguably in Lebanon. The export of technologies in
which Israel leads such as drones and cyber-security infrastructure to the Gulf states, either
directly or through a mediator, has become more prominent. Energy trades between Egypt and
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Israeli have become well documented in a way that elicits no outrage as it once may have, while
security cooperation in the Sinai has become a formality. The Qualifying Industrial Zones with
Egypt, Jordan and Israel have also become an acknowledged part of the regional political
economy.
Most significantly, however, are the newly conceived proposals by the current American
administration with regards to the “deal of the century”. The Trump-led “Peace to Prosperity”
Conference that took place in June of 2019 saw a congregation of political figures, diplomats and
investors from across the region. Though Israel did not send any government officials, plenty of
business figures were in attendance face to face with their Arab counterparts. The notable aspect
of the conference was the absence of any discussion regarding ending the occupation, granting
the Palestinians self-administration and self-determination, the right of return or frankly any of
the political dimensions of the Palestinian situation, instead focusing purely on the business
aspirations of the present figures. With the context of the preceding analysis, one can see that this
is not a unique occurrence but rather the natural extension of a process decades in the making.
Israeli occupation has now been revealed to be, clearer than ever before, a massive boon for the
ruling blocs of the Arab world and to expect this class to act outside their interests would simply
be delusional.
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